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Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security 
Bobby Chesney* and Danielle Citron** 
Harmful lies are nothing new. But the ability to distort reality has 
taken an exponential leap forward with “deep fake” technology. This 
capability makes it possible to create audio and video of real people 
saying and doing things they never said or did. Machine learning 
techniques are escalating the technology’s sophistication, making 
deep fakes ever more realistic and increasingly resistant to detection. 
Deep-fake technology has characteristics that enable rapid and 
widespread diffusion, putting it into the hands of both sophisticated 
and unsophisticated actors. 
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While deep-fake technology will bring certain benefits, it also will 
introduce many harms. The marketplace of ideas already suffers from 
truth decay as our networked information environment interacts in 
toxic ways with our cognitive biases. Deep fakes will exacerbate this 
problem significantly. Individuals and businesses will face novel forms 
of exploitation, intimidation, and personal sabotage. The risks to our 
democracy and to national security are profound as well. 
Our aim is to provide the first in-depth assessment of the causes 
and consequences of this disruptive technological change, and to 
explore the existing and potential tools for responding to it. We survey 
a broad array of responses, including: the role of technological 
solutions; criminal penalties, civil liability, and regulatory action; 
military and covert-action responses; economic sanctions; and market 
developments. We cover the waterfront from immunities to immutable 
authentication trails, offering recommendations to improve law and 
policy and anticipating the pitfalls embedded in various solutions. 
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Through the magic of social media, it all went viral: a vivid photograph, an 
inflammatory fake version, an animation expanding on the fake, posts debunking 
the fakes, and stories trying to make sense of the situation.1 It was both a sign of 
the times and a cautionary tale about the challenges ahead. 
The episode centered on Emma González, a student who survived the 
horrific shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida, in February 2018. In the aftermath of the shooting, a number of the 
students emerged as potent voices in the national debate over gun control. Emma, 
in particular, gained prominence thanks to the closing speech she delivered 
during the “March for Our Lives” protest in Washington, D.C., as well as a 
contemporaneous article she wrote for Teen Vogue.2 Fatefully, the Teen Vogue 
 
 1. Alex Horton, A Fake Photo of Emma González Went Viral on the Far Right, Where 
Parkland Teens are Villains, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2018/03/25/a-fake-photo-of-emma-gonzalez-went-viral-on-the-far-right-where-parkland-
teens-are-villains/?utm_term=.0b0f8655530d [https://perma.cc/6NDJ-WADV]. 
 2. Florida Student Emma Gonzalez [sic] to Lawmakers and Gun Advocates: ‘We call BS’, 
CNN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/17/us/florida-student-emma-gonzalez-
speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZE3B-MVPD]; Emma González, Emma González on Why This 
Generation Needs Gun Control, TEEN VOGUE (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/emma-gonzalez-parkland-gun-control-cover?mbid=social_twitter 
[https://perma.cc/P8TQ-P2ZR]. 
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piece incorporated a video entitled “This Is Why We March,” including a 
visually arresting sequence in which Emma rips up a large sheet displaying a 
bullseye target. 
A powerful still image of Emma ripping up the bullseye target began to 
circulate on the Internet. But soon someone generated a fake version, in which 
the torn sheet is not a bullseye, but rather a copy of the Constitution of the United 
States. While on some level the fake image might be construed as artistic fiction 
highlighting the inconsistency of gun control with the Second Amendment, the 
fake was not framed that way. Instead, it was depicted as a true image of Emma 
González ripping up the Constitution. 
The image soon went viral. A fake of the video also appeared, though it 
was more obvious that it had been manipulated. Still, the video circulated widely, 
thanks in part to actor Adam Baldwin circulating it to a quarter million followers 
on Twitter (along with the disturbing hashtag #Vorwärts—the German word for 
“forward,” a reference to neo-Nazis’ nod to the word’s role in a Hitler Youth 
anthem). 3 
Several factors combined to limit the harm from this fakery. First, the 
genuine image already was in wide circulation and available at its original 
source. This made it fast and easy to fact-check the fakes. Second, the intense 
national attention associated with the post-Parkland gun control debate and, 
especially, the role of students like Emma in that debate, ensured that journalists 
paid attention to the issue, spending time and effort to debunk the fakes. Third, 
the fakes were of poor quality (though audiences inclined to believe their 
message might disregard the red flags). 
Even with those constraints, though, many believed the fakes, and harm 
ensued. Our national dialogue on gun control has suffered some degree of 
 
 3. See Horton, supra note 1. 
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distortion; Emma has likely suffered some degree of anguish over the episode; 
and other Parkland victims likely felt maligned and discredited. Falsified 
imagery, in short, has already exacted significant costs for individuals and 
society. But the situation is about to get much worse, as this Article shows. 
Technologies for altering images, video, or audio (or even creating them 
from scratch) in ways that are highly -realistic and difficult to detect are maturing 
rapidly. As they ripen and diffuse, the problems illustrated by the Emma 
González episode will expand and generate significant policy and legal 
challenges. Imagine a deep fake video, released the day before an election, 
making it appear that a candidate for office has made an inflammatory statement. 
Or what if, in the wake of the Trump-Putin tête-à-tête at Helsinki in 2018, 
someone circulated a deep fake audio recording that seemed to portray President 
Trump as promising not to take any action should Russia interfere with certain 
NATO allies. Screenwriters are already building such prospects into their 
plotlines.4 The real world will not lag far behind. 
Pornographers have been early adopters of the technology, interposing the 
faces of celebrities into sex videos. This has given rise to the label “deep fake” 
for such digitized impersonations. We use that label here more broadly, as 
shorthand for the full range of hyper-realistic digital falsification of images, 
video, and audio. 
This full range will entail, sooner rather than later, a disturbing array of 
malicious uses. We are by no means the first to observe that deep fakes will 
migrate far beyond the pornography context, with great potential for harm.5 We 
 
 4. See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Sheera Frenkel, In India Election, False Posts and Hate Speech 
Flummox Facebook, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/technology/india-elections-facebook.html 
[https://perma.cc/B9CP-MPPK] (describing the deluge of fake and manipulated videos and images 
circulated in the lead up to elections in India); Homeland: Like Bad at Things (Showtime television 
broadcast Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.sho.com/homeland/season/7/episode/4/like-bad-at-things 
[https://perma.cc/25XK-NN3Y]; Taken: Verum Nocet (NBC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2018) 
https://www.nbc.com/taken/video/verum-nocet/3688929 [https://perma.cc/CVP2-PNXZ] (depicting a 
deep-fake video in which a character appears to recite song lyrics); The Good Fight: Day 408 (CBS 
television broadcast Mar. 4, 2018) (depicting fake audio purporting to be President Trump); The Good 
Fight: Day 464 (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2018) (featuring a deep-fake video of the alleged 
“golden shower” incident involving President Trump). 
 5. See, e.g., Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked: Everyone is Making AI-Generated Fake 
Porn Now, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley 
[https://perma.cc/V9NT-CBW8] (“[T]echnology[] allows anyone with sufficient raw footage to work 
with to convincingly place any face in any video.”); see also @BuzzFeed, You Won’t Believe What 
Obama Says in This Video, TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/BuzzFeed/status/986257991799222272 [https://perma.cc/C38K-B377] (“We’re 
entering an era in which our enemies can make anyone say anything at any point in time.”); Tim Mak, 
All Things Considered: Technologies to Create Fake Audio and Video Are Quickly Evolving, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/02/598916380/technologies-to-create-fake-
audio-and-video-are-quickly-evolving [https://perma.cc/NY23-YVQD] (discussing deep-fake videos 
created for political reasons and misinformation campaigns); Julian Sanchez (@normative), TWITTER 
(Jan. 24, 2018, 12:26 PM) (“The prospect of any Internet rando being able to swap anyone’s face into 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 
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do, however, provide the first comprehensive survey of these harms and potential 
responses to them. We break new ground by giving early warning regarding the 
powerful incentives that deep fakes produce for privacy-destructive solutions. 
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I begins with a description of the 
technological innovations pushing deep fakes into the realm of hyper-realism 
and making them increasingly difficult to debunk. It then discusses the 
amplifying power of social media and the confounding influence of cognitive 
biases. 
Part II surveys the benefits and the costs of deep fakes. The upsides of deep 
fakes include artistic exploration and educative contributions. The downsides of 
deep fakes, however, are as varied as they are costly. Some harms are suffered 
by individuals or groups, such as when deep fakes are deployed to exploit or 
sabotage individual identities and corporate opportunities. Others impact society 
more broadly, such as distortion of policy debates, manipulation of elections, 
erosion of trust in institutions, exacerbation of social divisions, damage to 
national security, and disruption of international relations. And, in what we call 
the “liar’s dividend,” deep fakes make it easier for liars to avoid accountability 
for things that are in fact true. 
Part III turns to the question of remedies. We survey an array of existing or 
potential solutions involving civil and criminal liability, agency regulation, and 
“active measures” in special contexts like armed conflict and covert action. We 
also discuss technology-driven market responses, including not just the 
promotion of debunking technologies, but also the prospect of an alibi service, 
such as privacy-destructive life logging. We find, in the end, that there are no 
silver-bullet solutions. Thus, we couple our recommendations with warnings to 
the public, policymakers, and educators. 
I. 
TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEEP-FAKES PROBLEM 
Digital impersonation is increasingly realistic and convincing. Deep-fake 
technology is the cutting-edge of that trend. It leverages machine-learning 
algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of actual 
people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations out of digital whole 
cloth.6 The end result is realistic-looking video or audio making it appear that 
someone said or did something. Although deep fakes can be created with the 
consent of people being featured, more often they will be created without it. This 
Part describes the technology and the forces ensuring its diffusion, virality, and 
entrenchment. 
 
porn is incredibly creepy. But my first thought is that we have not even scratched the surface of how bad 
‘fake news’ is going to get.”). 
 6. See Cole, supra note 5. 
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A. Emergent Technology for Robust Deep Fakes 
Doctored imagery is neither new nor rare. Innocuous doctoring of images—
such as tweaks to lighting or the application of a filter to improve image 
quality—is ubiquitous. Tools like Photoshop enable images to be tweaked in 
both superficial and substantive ways.7 The field of digital forensics has been 
grappling with the challenge of detecting digital alterations for some time.8 
Generally, forensic techniques are automated and thus less dependent on the 
human eye to spot discrepancies.9 While the detection of doctored audio and 
video was once fairly straightforward,10 the emergence of generative technology 
capitalizing on machine learning promises to shift this balance. It will enable the 
production of altered (or even wholly invented) images, videos, and audios that 
are more realistic and more difficult to debunk than they have been in the past. 
This technology often involves the use of a “neural network” for machine 
learning. The neural network begins as a kind of tabula rasa featuring a nodal 
network controlled by a set of numerical standards set at random.11 Much as 
experience refines the brain’s neural nodes, examples train the neural network 
system.12 If the network processes a broad array of training examples, it should 
be able to create increasingly accurate models.13 It is through this process that 
neural networks categorize audio, video, or images and generate realistic 
impersonations or alterations.14 
 
 7. See, e.g., Stan Horaczek, Spot Faked Photos Using Digital Forensic Techniques, POPULAR 
SCIENCE (July 21, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/use-photo-forensics-to-spot-faked-images 
[https://perma.cc/G72B-VLF2] (depicting and discussing a series of manipulated photographs). 
 8. Doctored images have been prevalent since the advent of the photography. See PHOTO 
TAMPERING THROUGHOUT HISTORY, http://pth.izitru.com [https://perma.cc/5QSZ-NULR]. The 
gallery was curated by FourandSix Technologies, Inc. 
 9. See Tiffanie Wen, The Hidden Signs That Can Reveal a Fake Photo, BBC FUTURE (June 
30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170629-the-hidden-signs-that-can-reveal-if-a-photo-is-
fake [https://perma.cc/W9NX-XGKJ]. IZITRU.COM was a project spearheaded by Dartmouth’s Dr. 
Hany Farid. It allowed users to upload photos to determine if they were fakes. The service was aimed at 
“legions of citizen journalists who want[ed] to dispel doubts that what they [were] posting [wa]s real.” 
Rick Gladstone, Photos Trusted but Verified, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2014), 
https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/photos-trusted-but-verified [https://perma.cc/7A73-URKP]. 
 10. See Steven Melendez, How DARPA‘s Fighting Deepfakes, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40551971/can-new-forensic-tech-win-war-on-ai-generated-fake-
images [https://perma.cc/9A8L-LFTQ]. 
 11. Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), 
http://news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414 [https://perma.cc/VTA6-
4Z2D]. 
 12. Natalie Wolchover, New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Neural Networks, 
WIRED (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/new-theory-deep-learning 
[https://perma.cc/UEL5-69ND]. 
 13. Will Knight, Meet the Fake Celebrities Dreamed Up By AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 31, 
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609290/meet-the-fake-celebrities-dreamed-
up-by-ai [https://perma.cc/D3A3-JFY4]. 
 14. Will Knight, Real or Fake? AI is Making it Very Hard to Know, MIT TECH. REV. (May 1, 
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604270/real-or-fake-ai-is-making-it-very-hard-to-know 
[https://perma.cc/3MQN-A4VH]. 
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To take a prominent example, researchers at the University of Washington 
have created a neural network tool that alters videos so speakers say something 
different from what they originally said.15 They demonstrated the technology 
with a video of former President Barack Obama (for whom plentiful video 
footage was available to train the network) that made it appear that he said things 
that he had not.16 
By itself, the emergence of machine learning through neural network 
methods would portend a significant increase in the capacity to create false 
images, videos, and audio. But the story does not end there. Enter “generative 
adversarial networks,” otherwise known as GANs. The GAN approach, invented 
by Google researcher Ian Goodfellow, brings two neural networks to bear 
simultaneously.17 One network, known as the generator, draws on a dataset to 
produce a sample that mimics the dataset.18 The other network, the discriminator, 
assesses the degree to which the generator succeeded.19 In an iterative fashion, 
the assessments from the discriminator inform the assessments of the generator. 
The result far exceeds the speed, scale, and nuance of what human reviewers 
could achieve.20 Growing sophistication of the GAN approach is sure to lead to 
the production of increasingly convincing deep fakes.21 
 
 15. SUPASORN SUWAJANAKORN ET AL., SYNTHESIZING OBAMA: LEARNING LIP SYNC FROM 
AUDIO, 36 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS, no. 4, art. 95 (July 2017), 
http://grail.cs.washington.edu/projects/AudioToObama/siggraph17_obama.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DCY-XK58]; James Vincent, New AI Research Makes It Easier to Create Fake 
Footage of Someone Speaking, VERGE (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/12/15957844/ai-fake-video-audio-speech-obama 
[https://perma.cc/3SKP-EKGT]. 
 16. Charles Q. Choi, AI Creates Fake Obama, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 12, 2017), 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/robotics/artificial-intelligence/ai-creates-fake-obama 
[https://perma.cc/M6GP-TNZ4]; see also Joon Son Chung et al., You Said That? (July 18, 2017) (British 
Machine Vision conference paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.02966 [https://perma.cc/6NAH-MAYL]. 
 17. See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets (June 10, 2014) (Neural 
Information Processing Systems conference paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.2661 
[https://perma.cc/97SH-H7DD] (introducing the GAN approach); see also Tero Karras, et al., 
Progressive Growing of GANs for Improved Quality, Stability, and Variation, ICLR 2018, at 1-2 (Apr. 
2018) (conference paper), http://research.nvidia.com/sites/default/files/pubs/2017-10_Progressive-
Growing-of/karras2018iclr-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSK2-NBAE] (explaining neural networks in 
the GAN approach). 
 18. Karras, supra note 17, at 1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. Consider research conducted at Nvidia. Karras, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining a novel 
approach that begins training cycles with low-resolution images and gradually shifts to higher-resolution 
images, producing better and much quicker results). The New York Times recently profiled the Nvidia 
team’s work. See Cade Metz & Keith Collins, How an A.I. ‘Cat-and-Mouse Game’ Generates 
Believable Fake Photos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/02/technology/ai-generated-photos.html 
[https://perma.cc/6DLQ-RDWD]. For further illustrations of the GAN approach, see Martin Arjovsky 
et al., Wasserstein GAN (Dec. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review); 
Chris Donahue et al., Semantically Decomposing the Latent Spaces of Generative Adversarial 
Networks, ICLR 2018 (Feb. 22, 2018) (conference paper) (on file with California Law Review), 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 
2019] DEEP FAKES 1761 
The same is true with respect to generating convincing audio fakes. In the 
past, the primary method of generating audio entailed the creation of a large 
database of sound fragments from a source, which would then be combined and 
reordered to generate simulated speech. New approaches promise greater 
sophistication, including Google DeepMind’s “Wavenet” model,22 Baidu’s 
DeepVoice,23 and GAN models.24 Startup Lyrebird has posted short audio clips 
simulating Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Hillary Clinton discussing its 
technology with admiration.25 
In comparison to private and academic efforts to develop deep-fake 
technology, less is currently known about governmental research.26 Given the 
possible utility of deep-fake techniques for various government purposes—
including the need to defend against hostile uses—it is a safe bet that state actors 
 
https://github.com/chrisdonahue/sdgan; Phillip Isola et al., Image-to-Image Translation with 
Conditional Adversarial Nets (Nov. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law 
Review); Alec Radford et al., Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional 
Generative Adversarial Networks (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law 
Review); Jun-Yan Zhu et al., Unpaired Image-to-Image Translation Using Cycle-Consistent Adversarial 
Networks (Nov. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review). 
 22. Aaron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio (Sept. 19, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.03499.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QX4W-E6JT]. 
 23. Ben Popper, Baidu’s New System Can Learn to Imitate Every Accent, VERGE (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/24/16526370/baidu-deepvoice-3-ai-text-to-speech-voice 
[https://perma.cc/NXV2-GDVJ]. 
 24. See Chris Donahue et al., Adversarial Audio Synthesis (Feb. 9, 2019) (conference paper), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04208.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UG-334U]; Yang Gao et al., Voice 
Impersonation Using Generative Adversarial Networks (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06840 [https://perma.cc/5HZV-ZLD3]. 
 25. See Bahar Gholipour, New AI Tech Can Mimic Any Voice, SCI. AM. (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-ai-tech-can-mimic-any-voice [https://perma.cc/2HSP-
83C3]. The ability to cause havoc by using this technology to portray persons saying things they have 
never said looms large. Lyrebird’s website includes an “ethics” statement, which defensively invokes 
notions of technological determinism. The statement argues that impersonation technology is inevitable 
and that society benefits from gradual introduction to it. Ethics, LYREBIRD, https://lyrebird.ai/ethics 
[https://perma.cc/Q57E-G6MK] (“Imagine that we had decided not to release this technology at all. 
Others would develop it and who knows if their intentions would be as sincere as ours: they could, for 
example, only sell the technology to a specific company or an ill-intentioned organization. By contrast, 
we are making the technology available to anyone and we are introducing it incrementally so that society 
can adapt to it, leverage its positive aspects for good, while preventing potentially negative 
applications.”). 
 26. DARPA’s MediFor program is working to “[develop] technologies for the automated 
assessment of the integrity of an image or video and [integrate] these in an end-to-end media forensics 
platform.” Matt Turek, Media Forensics (MediFor), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, 
https://www.darpa.mil/program/media-forensics [https://perma.cc/VBY5-BQJA]. IARPA’s DIVA 
program is attempting to use artificial intelligence to identify threats by sifting through video imagery. 
Deep Intermodal Video Analytics (DIVA) Program, INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS 
ACTIVITY, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/diva [https://perma.cc/4VDX-B68W]. 
There are no grants from the National Science Foundation awarding federal dollars to researchers 
studying the detection of doctored audio and video content at this time. E-mail from Seth M. Goldstein, 
Project Manager, IARPA, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Samuel Morse (Apr. 6, 
2018, 7:49 AM) (on file with authors). 
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are conducting classified research in this area. However, it is unclear whether 
classified research lags behind or outpaces commercial and academic efforts. At 
the least, we can say with confidence that industry, academia, and governments 
have the motive, means, and opportunity to push this technology forward at a 
rapid clip. 
B. Diffusion of Deep-Fake Technology 
The capacity to generate persuasive deep fakes will not stay in the hands of 
either technologically sophisticated or responsible actors.27 For better or worse, 
deep-fake technology will diffuse and democratize rapidly. 
As Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum explained in The Future of 
Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones, technologies—even 
dangerous ones—tend to diffuse over time.28 Firearms developed for state-
controlled armed forces are now sold to the public for relatively modest prices.29 
The tendency for technologies to spread only lags if they require scarce inputs 
that function (or are made to function) as chokepoints to curtail access.30 Scarcity 
as a constraint on diffusion works best where the input in question is tangible 
and hard to obtain; such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium to create 
nuclear weapons.31 
Often though, the only scarce input for a new technology is the knowledge 
behind a novel process or unique data sets. Where the constraint involves an 
intangible resource like information, preserving secrecy requires not only 
security against theft, espionage, and mistaken disclosure, but also the capacity 
and will to keep the information confidential.32 Depending on the circumstances, 
the relevant actors may not want to keep the information to themselves and, 
indeed, may have affirmative commercial or intellectual motivation to disperse 
it, as in the case of academics or business enterprises.33 
 
 27. See Jaime Dunaway, Reddit (Finally) Bans Deepfake Communities, but Face-Swapping 
Porn Isn’t Going Anywhere, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/reddit-finally-
bans-deepfake-communities-but-face-swapping-porn-isnt-going-anywhere.html 
[https://perma.cc/A4Z7-2LDF]. 
 28. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: 
ROBOTS AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES. CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT (2015). 
 29. Fresh Air: Assault Style Weapons in the Civilian Market, NPR (radio broadcast Dec. 20, 
2012). Program host Terry Gross interviews Tom Diaz, a policy analyst for the Violence Policy Center. 
A transcript of the interview can be found at 
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=167694808 [https://perma.cc/CE3F-
5AFX]. 
 30. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY (1996). 
 31. Id. 
 32. The techniques that are used to combat cyber attacks and threats are often published in 
scientific papers, so that a multitude of actors can implement these shields as a defense measure. 
However, the sophisticated malfeasor can use this information to create cyber weapons that circumvent 
the defenses that researchers create. 
 33. In April 2016, the hacker group “Shadow Brokers” released malware that had allegedly been 
created by the National Security Agency (NSA). One month later, the malware was used to propagate 
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Consequently, the capacity to generate deep fakes is sure to diffuse rapidly 
no matter what efforts are made to safeguard it. The capacity does not depend on 
scarce tangible inputs, but rather on access to knowledge like GANs and other 
approaches to machine learning. As the volume and sophistication of publicly 
available deep-fake research and services increase, user-friendly tools will be 
developed and propagated online, allowing diffusion to reach beyond experts. 
Such diffusion has occurred in the past both through commercial and black-
market means, as seen with graphic manipulation tools like Photoshop and 
malware services on the dark web.34 User-friendly capacity to generate deep 
fakes likely will follow a similar course on both dimensions.35 
Indeed, diffusion has begun for deep-fake technology. The recent wave of 
attention generated by deep fakes began after a Reddit user posted a tool inserting 
the faces of celebrities into porn videos.36 Once Fake App, “a desktop app for 
creating photorealistic faceswap videos made with deep learning,” appeared 
online, the public adopted it in short order.37 Following the straightforward steps 
provided by Fake App, a New York Times reporter created a semi-realistic deep-
fake video of his face on actor Chris Pratt’s body with 1,861 images of himself 
and 1,023 images of Chris Pratt.38 After enlisting the help of someone with 
experience blending facial features and source footage, the reporter created a 
realistic video featuring him as Jimmy Kimmel.39 This portends the diffusion of 
ever more sophisticated versions of deep-fake technology. 
C. Fueling the Fire 
The capacity to create deep fakes comes at a perilous time. No longer is the 
public’s attention exclusively in the hands of trusted media companies. 
Individuals peddling deep fakes can quickly reach a massive, even global, 
 
the WannaCry cyber attacks, which wreaked havoc on network systems around the globe, threatening 
to erase files if a ransom was not paid through Bitcoin. See Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow 
Brokers?, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/shadow-brokers/527778 
[https://perma.cc/UW2F-V36G]. 
 34. See ARMOR, THE BLACK MARKET REPORT: A LOOK INSIDE THE DARK WEB 2 (2018), 
https://www.armor.com/app/uploads/2018/03/2018-Q1-Reports-BlackMarket-DIGITAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4UJA-QJ94] (explaining that the means to conduct a DDoS attack can be purchased 
for $10/hour, or $200/day). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Emma Grey Ellis, People Can Put Your Face on Porn—And the Law Can’t Help You, 
WIRED (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/face-swap-porn-legal-limbo 
[https://perma.cc/B7K7-Y79L]. 
 37. FAKEAPP, https://www.fakeapp.org. 
 38. Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html 
[https://perma.cc/U5QE-EPHX]. 
 39. Id. 
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audience. As this section explores, networked phenomena, rooted in cognitive 
bias, will fuel that effort.40 
Twenty-five years ago, the practical ability of individuals and organizations 
to distribute images, audio, and video (whether authentic or not) was limited. In 
most countries, a handful of media organizations disseminated content on a 
national or global basis. In the U.S., the major television and radio networks, 
newspapers, magazines, and book publishers controlled the spread of 
information.41 While governments, advertisers, and prominent figures could 
influence mass media, most were left to pursue local distribution of content. For 
better or worse, relatively few individuals or entities could reach large audiences 
in this few-to-many information distribution environment.42 
The information revolution has disrupted this content distribution model.43 
Today, innumerable platforms facilitate global connectivity. Generally speaking, 
the networked environment blends the few-to-many and many-to-many models 
of content distribution, democratizing access to communication to an 
unprecedented degree.44 This reduces the overall amount of gatekeeping, though 
control still remains with the companies responsible for our digital 
infrastructure.45 For instance, content platforms have terms-of-service 
agreements, which ban certain forms of content based on companies’ values.46 
 
 40. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) 
[hereinafter CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE] (exploring pathologies attendant to online speech 
including deindividuation, virality, information cascades, group polarization, and filter bubbles). For 
important early work on filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in online interactions, see 
generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001). 
 41. See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON 
TO GOOGLE (2008); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY 
WE SHOULD WORRY) (2011). 
 44. This ably captures the online environment accessible for those living in the United States. 
As Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu argued a decade ago, geographic borders and the will of governments 
can and do make themselves known online. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO OWNS 
THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). The Internet visible in China is vastly 
different from the Internet visible in the EU, which is different from the Internet visible in the United 
States (and likely to become more so soon). See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Firewall of 
China: Xi Jinping’s Internet Shutdown, GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-
shutdown [https://perma.cc/8GUS-EC59]; Casey Newton, Europe Is Splitting the Internet into Three: 
How the Copyright Directive Reshapes the Open Web, VERGE (Mar. 27, 2019, 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283541/european-union-copyright-directive-Internet-article-
13 [https://perma.cc/K235-RZ7Q]. 
 45. Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You 
Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1361–64 (2018). 
 46. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 232–35; Danielle Keats 
Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1035, 1037 (2018) [hereinafter Citron, Extremist Speech] (noting that platforms’ terms of service and 
community guidelines have banned child pornography, spam, phishing, fraud, impersonation, copyright 
violations, threats, cyber stalking, nonconsensual pornography, and hate speech); see also DANIELLE 
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They experience pressure from, or adhere to legal mandates of, governments to 
block or filter certain information like hate speech or “fake news.”47 
Although private companies have enormous power to moderate content 
(shadow banning it, lowering its prominence, and so on), they may decline to 
filter or block content that does not amount to obvious illegality. Generally 
speaking, there is far less screening of content for accuracy, quality, or 
suppression of facts or opinions that some authority deems undesirable. 
Content not only can find its way to online audiences, but can circulate far 
and wide, sometimes going viral both online and, at times, amplifying further 
once picked up by traditional media. A variety of cognitive heuristics help fuel 
these dynamics. Three phenomena in particular—the “information cascade” 
dynamic, human attraction to negative and novel information, and filter 
bubbles—help explain why deep fakes may be especially prone to going viral. 
First, consider the “information cascade” dynamic.48 Information cascades 
result when people stop paying sufficient attention to their own information, 
relying instead on what they assume others have reliably determined and then 
passing that information along.. Because people cannot know everything, they 
often rely on what others say, even if it contradicts their own knowledge.49 At a 
certain point, people stop paying attention to their own information and look to 
what others know.50 And when people pass along what others think, the 
 
KEATS CITRON & QUINTA JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE: CONTENT MODERATION AT AN INFLECTION 
POINT 12 (Hoover Institution ed., 2018) [hereinafter CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE], 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic_webreadypdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5L6-GNCH] (noting Facebook’s Terms of Service agreement banning 
nonconsensual pornography). See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
61 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights]; Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1458 (2011) (discussing hate speech restrictions contained in platforms’ terms of service 
agreements); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017) (arguing that law should incentivize 
online platforms to address known illegality in a reasonable manner). 
 47. See Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 46, at 1040–49 (exploring pressure from EU 
Commission on major platforms to remove extremist speech and hate speech). For important work on 
global censorship efforts, see the scholarship of Anupam Chander, Daphne Keller, and Rebecca 
McKinnon. See generally REBECCA MCKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE 
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 6 (2012) (arguing that ISPs and online platforms have “far too 
much power over citizens’ lives, in ways that are insufficiently transparent or accountable to the public 
interest.”); Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1819–35 (2012); Anupam 
Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2011); Daphne Keller, Toward a Clearer 
Conversation About Platform Liability, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. U. (April 6, 2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/toward-clearer-conversation-about-platform-liability 
[https://perma.cc/GWM7-J8PW]. 
 48. Carr, supra note 41. See generally DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, 
CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD (2010) (exploring 
cognitive biases in the information marketplace); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007) (same). 
 49. See generally EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 
1766 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:1753 
credibility of the original claim snowballs.51 As the cycle repeats, the cascade 
strengthens.52 
Social media platforms are a ripe environment for the formation of 
information cascades spreading content of all stripes. From there, cascades can 
spill over to traditional mass-audience outlets that take note of the surge of social 
media interest and as a result cover a story that otherwise they might not have.53 
Social movements have leveraged the power of information cascades, including 
Black Lives Matter activists54 and the Never Again movement of the Parkland 
High School students.55 Arab Spring protesters spread videos and photographs 
of police torture.56 Journalist Howard Rheingold refers to positive information 
cascades as “smart mobs.”57 But not every mob is smart or laudable, and the 
information cascade dynamic does not account for such distinctions. The Russian 
covert action program to sow discord in the United States during the 2016 
election provides ample demonstration.58 
Second, our natural tendency to propagate negative and novel information 
may enable viral circulation of deep fakes. Negative and novel information 
“grab[s] our attention as human beings and [] cause[s] us to want to share that 
information with others—we’re attentive to novel threats and especially attentive 
to negative threats.”59 Data scientists, for instance, studied 126,000 news stories 
shared on Twitter from 2006 to 2010, using third-party fact-checking sites to 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (elaborating the concept of social 
production in relation to rapid evolution of the information marketplace and resistance to that trend). 
 54. See Monica Anderson & Paul Hitlin, The Hashtag #BlackLivesMatter Emerges: Social 
Activism on Twitter, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.pewInternet.org/2016/08/15/the-
hashtag-blacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter [https://perma.cc/4BW9-L67G] 
(discussing Black Lives Matter activists’ use of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter to identify their message 
and display solidarity around race and police use of force). 
 55. Jonah Engel Bromwich, How the Parkland Students Got So Good at Social Media, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/parkland-students-social-media.html 
[https://perma.cc/7AW9-4HR2] (discussing students’ use of social media to keep sustained political 
attention on the Parkland tragedy). 
 56. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 68. 
 57. RHEINGOLD, supra note 41. 
 58. The 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia is available at https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download 
[https://perma.cc/B6WJ-4FLX]; see also David A. Graham, What the Mueller Indictment Reveals, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/mueller-
roadmap/553604 [https://perma.cc/WU2U-XHWW]; Tim Mak & Audrey McNamara, Mueller 
Indictment of Russian Operatives Details Playbook of Information Warfare, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 
17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/17/586690342/mueller-indictment-of-russian-operatives-
details-playbook-of-information-warfare [https://perma.cc/RJ6F-999R]. 
 59. Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-study-
ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104 [https://perma.cc/PJS2-RKMF]. 
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classify them as true or false.60 According to the study, hoaxes and false rumors 
reached people ten times faster than accurate stories.61 Even when researchers 
controlled for differences between accounts originating rumors, falsehoods were 
70 percent more likely to get retweeted than accurate news.62 The uneven spread 
of fake news was not due to bots, which in fact retweeted falsehoods at the same 
frequency as accurate information.63 Rather, false news spread faster due to 
people retweeting inaccurate news items.64 The study’s authors hypothesized 
that falsehoods had greater traction because they seemed more “novel” and 
evocative than real news.65 False rumors tended to elicit responses expressing 
surprise and disgust, while accurate stories evoked replies associated with 
sadness and trust.66 
With human beings seemingly more inclined to spread negative and novel 
falsehoods, the field is ripe for bots to spur and escalate the spreading of negative 
misinformation.67 Facebook estimates that as many as 60 million bots may be 
infesting its platform.68 Bots were responsible for a substantial portion of 
political content posted during the 2016 election.69 Bots also can manipulate 
algorithms used to predict potential engagement with content. 
Negative information not only is tempting to share, but is also relatively 
“sticky.” As social science research shows, people tend to credit—and 
remember—negative information far more than positive information.70 Coupled 
with our natural predisposition towards certain stimuli like sex, gossip, and 
violence, that tendency provides a welcome environment for harmful deep 
fakes.71 The Internet amplifies this effect, which helps explain the popularity of 
 
 60. Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 
1146 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146/tab-pdf [https://perma.cc/5U5D-
UHPZ]. 
 61. Id. at 1148. 
 62. Id. at 1149. 
 63. Id. at 1146. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1149. 
 66. Id. at 1146, 1150. 
 67. Meyer, supra note 59 (quoting political scientist Dave Karpf). 
 68. Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html 
[https://perma.cc/DX34-RENV] (“In November, Facebook disclosed to investors that it had at least 
twice as many fake users as it previously estimated, indicating that up to 60 million automated accounts 
may roam the world’s largest social media platform.”); see also Extremist Content and Russian 
Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
117th Cong. (2017) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-
disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions [https://perma.cc/M5L9-R2MY]. 
 69. David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a 
Multidisciplinary Effort, 359 SCIENCE 1094, 1095 (2018). 
 70. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accuracy: 
Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 217 (2007) 
(finding that “negative emotion conveys focal benefits on memory for detail”). 
 71. PARISER, supra note 40, at 13–14. 
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gossip sites like TMZ.com.72 Because search engines produce results based on 
our interests, they tend to feature more of the same—more sex and more gossip.73 
Third, filter bubbles further aggravate the spread of false information. Even 
without the aid of technology, we naturally tend to surround ourselves with 
information confirming our beliefs. Social media platforms supercharge this 
tendency by empowering users to endorse and re-share content.74 Platforms’ 
algorithms highlight popular information, especially if it has been shared by 
friends, and surround us with content from relatively homogenous groups.75 As 
endorsements and shares accumulate, the chances for an algorithmic boost 
increase. After seeing friends’ recommendations online, individuals tend to pass 
on those recommendations to their own networks.76 Because people tend to share 
information with which they agree, social media users are surrounded by 
information confirming their preexisting beliefs.77 This is what we mean by 
“filter bubble.”78 
Filter bubbles can be powerful insulators against the influence of contrary 
information. In a study of Facebook users, researchers found that individuals 
reading fact-checking articles had not originally consumed the fake news at 
issue, and those who consumed fake news in the first place almost never read a 
fact-check that might debunk it.79 
Taken together, common cognitive biases and social media capabilities are 
behind the viral spread of falsehoods and decay of truth. They have helped 
entrench what amounts to information tribalism, and the results plague public 
and private discourse. Information cascades, natural attraction to negative and 
novel information, and filter bubbles provide an all-too-welcoming environment 
as deep-fake capacities mature and proliferate. 
II. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Deep-fake technology can and will be used for a wide variety of purposes. 
Not all will be antisocial; some, in fact, will be profoundly prosocial. 
 
 72. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 68. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 67. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Political scientists Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler studied the production 
and consumption of fake news on Facebook during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. According to 
the study, filter bubbles were deep (with one in four individuals visiting from fake news websites), but 
narrow (the majority of fake news group consumption was concentrated among 10% of the public). See 
ANDREW GUESS ET AL., SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO MISINFORMATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
CONSUMPTION OF FAKE NEWS DURING THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 1 (2018) 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3VF-JVCL]. 
 79. See id. at 11. 
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Nevertheless, deep fakes can inflict a remarkable array of harms, many of which 
are exacerbated by features of the information environment explored above. 
A. Beneficial Uses of Deep-Fake Technology 
Human ingenuity no doubt will conceive many beneficial uses for deep-
fake technology. For now, the most obvious possibilities for beneficial uses fall 
under the headings of education, art, and the promotion of individual autonomy. 
1. Education 
Deep-fake technology creates an array of opportunities for educators, 
including the ability to provide students with information in compelling ways 
relative to traditional means like readings and lectures. This is similar to an 
earlier wave of educational innovation made possible by increasing access to 
ordinary video.80 With deep fakes, it will be possible to manufacture videos of 
historical figures speaking directly to students, giving an otherwise unappealing 
lecture a new lease on life.81 
Creating modified content will raise interesting questions about intellectual 
property protections and the reach of the fair use exemption. Setting those 
obstacles aside, the educational benefits of deep fakes are appealing from a 
pedagogical perspective in much the same way that is true for the advent of 
virtual and augmented reality production and viewing technologies.82 
The technology opens the door to relatively cheap and accessible 
production of video content that alters existing films or shows, particularly on 
the audio track, to illustrate a pedagogical point. For example, a scene from a 
war film could be altered to make it seem that a commander and her legal advisor 
are discussing application of the laws of war, when in the original the dialogue 
had nothing to do with that—and the scene could be re-run again and again with 
modifications to the dialogue tracking changes to the hypothetical scenario under 
 
 80. Emily Cruse, Using Educational Video in the Classroom: Theory, Research, and Practice, 
1-2 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.safarimontage.com/pdfs/training/UsingEducationalVideoInTheClassroom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AJ8Q-WZP4]. 
 81. Face2Face is a real-time face capture and reenactment software developed by researchers at 
the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, the Max-Planck-Institute for Informatics, and Stanford 
University. The applications of this technology could reinvent the way students learn about historical 
events and figures. See Justus Thies et al., Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB 
Videos (June 2016) (29th IEEE-CVPR 2016 conference paper), 
http://www.graphics.stanford.edu/~niessner/papers/2016/1facetoface/thies2016face.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S94K-DPU5]. 
 82. Adam Evans, Pros and Cons of Virtual Reality in the Classroom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/ProsCons-of-Virtual/243016 
[https://perma.cc/TN84-89SQ]. 
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consideration. If done well, it would surely beat just having the professor asking 
students to imagine the shifting scenario out of whole cloth.83 
The educational value of deep fakes will extend beyond the classroom. In 
the spring of 2018, Buzzfeed provided an apt example when it circulated a video 
that appeared to feature Barack Obama warning of the dangers of deep-fake 
technology itself.84 One can imagine deep fakes deployed to support educational 
campaigns by public-interest organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving. 
2. Art 
The potential artistic benefits of deep-fake technology relate to its 
educational benefits, though they need not serve any formal educational purpose. 
Thanks to the use of existing technologies that resurrect dead performers for 
fresh roles, the benefits to creativity are already familiar to mass audiences.85 For 
example, the startling appearance of the long-dead Peter Cushing as the 
venerable Grand Moff Tarkin in 2016’s Rogue One was made possible by a deft 
combination of live acting and technical wizardry. That prominent illustration 
delighted some and upset others.86 The Star Wars contribution to this theme 
continued in The Last Jedi when Carrie Fisher’s death led the filmmakers to fake 
additional dialogue using snippets from real recordings.87 
Not all artistic uses of deep-fake technologies will have commercial 
potential. Artists may find it appealing to express ideas through deep fakes, 
including, but not limited to, productions showing incongruities between 
apparent speakers and their apparent speech. Video artists might use deep-fake 
technology to satirize, parody, and critique public figures and public officials. 
Activists could use deep fakes to demonstrate their point in a way that words 
alone could not. 
3. Autonomy 
Just as art overlaps with education, deep fakes implicate self-expression. 
But not all uses of deep fakes for self-expression are best understood as art. Some 
 
 83. The facial animation software CrazyTalk, by Reallusion, animates faces from photographs 
or cartoons and can be used by educators to further pedagogical goals. The software is available at 
https://www.reallusion.com/crazytalk/default.html [https://perma.cc/TTX8-QMJP]. 
 84. See Choi, supra note 16. 
 85. Indeed, film contracts now increasingly address future uses of a person’s image in 
subsequent films via deep fake technology in the event of their death. 
 86. Dave Itzkoff, How ‘Rogue One’ Brought Back Familiar Faces, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/movies/how-rogue-one-brought-back-grand-moff-tarkin.html 
[https://perma.cc/F53C-TDYV]. 
 87. Evan Narcisse, It Took Some Movie Magic to Complete Carrie Fisher’s Leia Dialogue in 
The Last Jedi, GIZMODO (Dec. 8, 2017), https://io9.gizmodo.com/it-took-some-movie-magic-to-
complete-carrie-fishers-lei-1821121635 [https://perma.cc/NF5H-GPJF]. 
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may be used to facilitate “avatar” experiences for a variety of self-expressive 
ends that might best be described in terms of autonomy. 
Perhaps most notably, deep-fake audio technology holds promise to restore 
the ability of persons suffering from certain forms of paralysis, such as ALS, to 
speak with their own voice.88 Separately, individuals suffering from certain 
physical disabilities might interpose their faces and that of consenting partners 
into pornographic videos, enabling virtual engagement with an aspect of life 
unavailable to them in a conventional sense.89 
The utility of deep-fake technology for avatar experiences, which need not 
be limited to sex, closely relates to more familiar examples of technology. Video 
games, for example, enable a person to have or perceive experiences that might 
otherwise be impossible, dangerous, or otherwise undesirable if pursued in 
person. The customizable avatars from Nintendo Wii (known as “Mii”) provide 
a familiar and non-threatening example. The video game example underscores 
that the avatar scenario is not always a serious matter, and sometimes boils down 
to no more and no less than the pursuit of happiness. 
Deep-fake technology confers the ability to integrate more realistic 
simulacrums of one’s own self into an array of media, thus producing a stronger 
avatar effect. For some aspects of the pursuit of autonomy, this will be a very 
good thing (as the book and film Ready Player One suggests, albeit with 
reference to a vision of advanced virtual reality rather than deep-fake 
technology). Not so for others, however. Indeed, as we describe below, the 
prospects for the harmful use of deep-fake technology are legion. 
B. Harmful Uses of Deep-Fake Technology 
Human ingenuity, alas, is not limited to applying technology to beneficial 
ends. Like any technology, deep fakes also will be used to cause a broad 
spectrum of serious harms, many of them exacerbated by the combination of 
networked information systems and cognitive biases described above. 
1. Harm to Individuals or Organizations 
Lies about what other people have said or done are as old as human society, 
and come in many shapes and sizes. Some merely irritate or embarrass, while 
others humiliate and destroy; some spur violence. All of this will be true with 
deep fakes as well, only more so due to their inherent credibility and the manner 
 
 88. Sima Shakeri, Lyrebird Helps ALS Ice Bucket Challenge Co-Founder Pat Quinn Get His 
Voice Back: Project Revoice Can Change Lives, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/04/14/lyrebird-helps-als-ice-bucket-challenge-co-founder-pat-
quinn-get-his-voice-back_a_23411403 [https://perma.cc/R5SD-Y37Y]. 
 89. See Allie Volpe, Deepfake Porn has Terrifying Implications. But What if it Could Be Used 
for Good?, MEN’S HEALTH (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.menshealth.com/sex-
women/a19755663/deepfakes-porn-reddit-pornhub [https://perma.cc/EFX9-2BUE]. 
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in which they hide the liar’s creative role. Deep fakes will emerge as powerful 
mechanisms for some to exploit and sabotage others. 
a. Exploitation 
There will be no shortage of harmful exploitations. Some will be in the 
nature of theft, such as stealing people’s identities to extract financial or some 
other benefit. Others will be in the nature of abuse, commandeering a person’s 
identity to harm them or individuals who care about them. And some will involve 
both dimensions, whether the person creating the fake so intended or not. 
As an example of extracting value, consider the possibilities for the realm 
of extortion. Blackmailers might use deep fakes to extract something of value 
from people, even those who might normally have little or nothing to fear in this 
regard, who (quite reasonably) doubt their ability to debunk the fakes 
persuasively, or who fear that any debunking would fail to reach far and fast 
enough to prevent or undo the initial damage.90 In that case, victims might be 
forced to provide money, business secrets, or nude images or videos (a practice 
known as sextortion) to prevent the release of the deep fakes.91 Likewise, 
fraudulent kidnapping claims might prove more effective in extracting ransom 
when backed by video or audio appearing to depict a victim who is not in fact in 
the fraudster’s control. 
Not all value extraction takes a tangible form. Deep-fake technology can 
also be used to exploit an individual’s sexual identity for other’s gratification.92 
Thanks to deep-fake technology, an individual’s face, voice, and body can be 
swapped into real pornography.93 A subreddit (now closed) featured deep-fake 
sex videos of female celebrities and amassed more than 100,000 users.94 As one 
Reddit user asked, “I want to make a porn video with my ex-girlfriend. But I 
 
 90. See generally ADAM DODGE & ERICA JOHNSTONE, USING FAKE VIDEO TECHNOLOGY TO 
PERPETUATE INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 6 (2018), http://withoutmyconsent.org/blog/new-advisory-
helps-domestic-violence-survivors-prevent-and-stop-deepfake-abuse [https://perma.cc/K3Y2-XG2Q] 
(discussing how deep fakes used as black mail of an intimate partner could violate the California Family 
Code). The advisory was published by the non-profit organization Without My Consent, which combats 
online invasions of privacy. 
 91. Sextortion thrives on the threat that the extortionist will disclose sex videos or nude images 
unless more nude images or videos are provided. BENAJMIN WITTES ET AL., SEXTORTION: 
CYBERSECURITY, TEENAGERS, AND REMOTE SEXUAL ASSAULT (Brookings Inst. ed., 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/sextortion1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K9N-
5W7C]. 
 92. See DODGE & JOHNSTONE, supra note 90, at 6 (explaining the likelihood that domestic 
abusers and cyber stalkers will use deep sex tapes to harm victims); Janko Roettgers, ‘Deep Fakes’ Will 
Create Hollywood’s Next Sex Tape Scare, VARIETY (Feb. 2, 2018), 
http://variety.com/2018/digital/news/hollywood-sex-tapes-deepfakes-ai-1202685655 
[https://perma.cc/98HQ-668G]. 
 93. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L. J. 1870, 1921–24 (2019) [hereinafter 
Citron, Sexual Privacy]. 
 94. DODGE & JOHNSTONE, supra note 90, at 6. 
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don’t have any high-quality video with her, but I have lots of good photos.”95 A 
Discord user explained that he made a “pretty good” video of a girl he went to 
high school with, using around 380 photos scraped from her Instagram and 
Facebook accounts.96 
These examples highlight an important point: the gendered dimension of 
the exploitation of deep fakes. In all likelihood, the majority of victims of fake 
sex videos will be female. This has been the case for cyber stalking and non-
consensual pornography, and likely will be the case for deep-fake sex videos.97 
One can easily imagine deep-fake sex videos subjecting individuals to 
violent, humiliating sex acts. This shows that not all such fakes will be designed 
primarily, or at all, for the creator’s sexual or financial gratification. Some will 
be nothing less than cruel weapons meant to terrorize and inflict pain. Of deep-
fake sex videos, Mary Anne Franks has astutely said, “If you were the worst 
misogynist in the world, this technology would allow you to accomplish 
whatever you wanted.”98 
When victims discover that they have been used in deep-fake sex videos, 
the psychological damage may be profound—whether or not this was the video 
creator’s aim. Victims may feel humiliated and scared.99 Deep-fake sex videos 
force individuals into virtual sex, reducing them to sex objects. As Robin West 
has observed, threats of sexual violence “literally, albeit not physically, 
penetrates the body.”100 Deep-fake sex videos can transform rape threats into a 
terrifying virtual reality. They send the message that victims can be sexually 
abused at whim. Given the stigma of nude images, especially for women and 
girls, individuals depicted in fake sex videos also may suffer collateral 
consequences in the job market, among other places, as we explain in more detail 
below in our discussion of sabotage.101 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. ASIA A. EATON ET AL., 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN 
VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION 12 (Cyber C.R. Initiative ed., 2017), 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HYP-7ELV] (“Women were significantly more likely [1.7 times] to have been 
victims of [non-consensual porn] or to have been threatened with [non-consensual porn]. . . .”). 
 98. Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women: 




 99. See generally Rana Ayyub, In India, Journalists Face Slut-Shaming and Rape Threats, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/india-journalists-slut-shaming-
rape.html [https://perma.cc/A7WR-PF6L]; ‘I Couldn’t Talk or Sleep for Three Days’: Journalist Rana 
Ayyub’s Horrific Social Media Ordeal over Fake Tweet, Daily O (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.dailyo.in/variety/rana-ayyub-trolling-fake-tweet-social-media-harassment-
hindutva/story/1/23733.html [https://perma.cc/J6G6-H6GZ]. 
 100. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 102–03 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
 101. Deep-fake sex videos should be considered in light of the broader cyber stalking 
phenomenon, which more often targets women and usually involves online assaults that are sexually 
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These examples are but the tip of a disturbing iceberg. Like sexualized deep 
fakes, imagery depicting non-sexual abuse or violence might also be used to 
threaten, intimidate, and inflict psychological harm on the depicted victim (or 
those who care for that person). Deep fakes also might be used to portray 
someone, falsely, as endorsing a product, service, idea, or politician. Other forms 
of exploitation will abound. 
b. Sabotage 
In addition to inflicting direct psychological harm on victims, deep-fake 
technology can be used to harm victims along other dimensions due to their 
utility for reputational sabotage. Across every field of competition—workplace, 
romance, sports, marketplace, and politics—people will have the capacity to deal 
significant blows to the prospects of their rivals. 
It could mean the loss of romantic opportunity, the support of friends, the 
denial of a promotion, the cancellation of a business opportunity, and beyond. 
Deep-fake videos could depict a person destroying property in a drunken rage. 
They could show people stealing from a store; yelling vile, racist epithets; using 
drugs; or any manner of antisocial or embarrassing behavior like sounding 
incoherent. Depending on the circumstances, timing, and circulation of the fake, 
the effects could be devastating. 
In some instances, debunking the fake may come too late to remedy the 
initial harm. For example, consider how a rival might torpedo the draft position 
of a top pro sports prospect by releasing a compromising deep-fake video just as 
the draft begins. Even if the video is later doubted as a fake, it could be 
impossible to undo the consequences (which might involve the loss of millions 
of dollars) because once cautious teams make other picks, the victim may fall 
into later rounds of the draft (or out of the draft altogether).102 
The nature of today’s communication environment enhances the capacity 
of deep fakes to cause reputational harm. The combination of cognitive biases 
and algorithmic boosting increases the chances for salacious fakes to circulate. 
The ease of copying and storing data online—including storage in remote 
jurisdictions—makes it much harder to eliminate fakes once they are posted and 
shared. These considerations combined with the ever-improving search engines 
increase the chances that employers, business partners, or romantic interests will 
encounter the fake. 
 
threatening and sexually demeaning. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 13–
19. 
 102. This hypothetical is modeled on an actual event, albeit one involving a genuine rather than 
a falsified compromising video. In 2016, a highly regarded NFL prospect named Laremy Tunsill may 
have lost as much as $16 million when, on the verge of the NFL draft, someone released a video showing 
him smoking marijuana with a bong and gas mask. See Jack Holmes, A Hacker’s Tweet May Have Cost 
This NFL Prospect Almost $16 Million, ESQUIRE (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.esquire.com/sports/news/a44457/laremy-tunsil-nfl-draft-weed-lost-millions 
[https://perma.cc/7PEL-PRBF]. 
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Once discovered, deep fakes can be devastating to those searching for 
employment. Search results matter to employers.103 According to a 2009 
Microsoft study, more than 90 percent of employers use search results to make 
decisions about candidates, and in more than 77 percent of cases, those results 
have a negative result. As the study explained, employers often decline to 
interview or hire people because their search results featured “inappropriate 
photos.”104 The reason for those results should be obvious. It is less risky and 
expensive to hire people who do not have the baggage of damaged online 
reputations. This is especially true in fields where the competition for jobs is 
steep.105 There is little reason to think the dynamics would be significantly 
different with respect to romantic prospects.106 
Deep fakes can be used to sabotage business competitors. Deep-fake videos 
could show a rival company’s chief executive engaged in any manner of 
disreputable behavior, from purchasing illegal drugs to hiring underage 
prostitutes to uttering racial epithets to bribing government officials. Deep fakes 
could be released just in time to interfere with merger discussions or bids for 
government contracts. As with the sports draft example, mundane business 
opportunities could be thwarted even if the videos are ultimately exposed as 
fakes. 
 
 103.  Number of Employers Using Social Media to Screen Candidates at All-Time High, Finds 
Latest CareerBuilder Study, CAREERBUILDER: PRESS ROOM (June 15, 2017), 
http://press.careerbuilder.com/2017-06-15-Number-of-Employers-Using-Social-Media-to-Screen-
Candidates-at-All-Time-High-Finds-Latest-CareerBuilder-Study [https://perma.cc/K6BD-DYSV] 
(noting that a national survey conducted in 2017 found that over half of employers will not hire a 
candidate without an online presence and may choose not to hire a candidate based on negative social 
media content). 
 104. This has been the case for nude photos posted without consent, often known as revenge 
porn. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 17–18, 48–49 (exploring 
the economic fallout of the nonconsensual posting of someone’s nude image); Mary Anne Franks, 
“Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1308–23 (2017). For 
recent examples, see Tasneem Nashrulla, A Middle School Teacher Was Fired After a Student Obtained 
Her Topless Selfie. Now She is Suing the School District for Gender Discrimination, BUZZFEED (Apr. 
4. 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tasneemnashrulla/middle-school-teacher-fired-
topless-selfie-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3PGZ-CZ5R]; Annie Seifullah, Revenge Porn Took My Career. 
The Law Couldn’t Get It Back, JEZEBEL (July 18, 2018), https://jezebel.com/revenge-porn-took-my-
career-the-law-couldnt-get-it-bac-1827572768 [https://perma.cc/D9Y8-63WH]. 
 105. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2014) (“Most employers rely on candidates’ online reputations as an 
employment screen.”). 
 106. Journalist Rana Ayuub, who faced vicious online abuse including her image in deep-fake 
sex videos, explained that the deep fakes seemed designed to label her as “promiscuous,” “immoral,” 
and damaged goods. Ayyub, supra note 99. See generally Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 93, at 
1925–26 (discussing how victims of deep-fake sex videos felt crippled and unable to talk or eat, let alone 
engage with others); Danielle Keats Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (recounting fear of dating and embarrassment experienced by individuals whose nude 
photos were disclosed online without consent). 
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2. Harm to Society 
Deep fakes are not just a threat to specific individuals or entities. They have 
the capacity to harm society in a variety of ways. Consider the following: 
 Fake videos could feature public officials taking bribes, 
displaying racism, or engaging in adultery. 
 Politicians and other government officials could appear in 
locations where they were not, saying or doing things that they 
did not.107 
 Fake audio or video could involve damaging campaign material 
that claims to emanate from a political candidate when it does 
not.108 
 Fake videos could place them in meetings with spies or 
criminals, launching public outrage, criminal investigations, or 
both. 
 Soldiers could be shown murdering innocent civilians in a war 
zone, precipitating waves of violence and even strategic harms 
to a war effort.109 
 A deep fake might falsely depict a white police officer shooting 
an unarmed black man while shouting racial epithets. 
 A fake audio clip might “reveal” criminal behavior by a 
candidate on the eve of an election. 
 Falsified video appearing to show a Muslim man at a local 
mosque celebrating the Islamic State could stoke distrust of, or 
even violence against, that community. 
 A fake video might portray an Israeli official doing or saying 
something so inflammatory as to cause riots in neighboring 
countries, potentially disrupting diplomatic ties or sparking a 
wave of violence. 
 False audio might convincingly depict U.S. officials privately 
“admitting” a plan to commit an outrage overseas, timed to 
disrupt an important diplomatic initiative. 
 A fake video might depict emergency officials “announcing” 
an impending missile strike on Los Angeles or an emergent 
pandemic in New York City, provoking panic and worse. 
 
 107. See, e.g., Linton Weeks, A Very Weird Photo of Ulysses S. Grant, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 
27, 2015 11:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/npr-history-dept/2015/10/27/452089384/a-very-
weird-photo-of-ulysses-s-grant [https://perma.cc/F3U6-WRVF] (discussing a doctored photo of 
Ulysses S. Grant from the Library of Congress archives that was created over 100 years ago). 
 108. For powerful work on the potential damage of deep-fake campaign speech, see Rebecca 
Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
 109. Cf. Vindu Goel and Sheera Frenkel, In India Election, False Posts and Hate Speech 
Flummox Facebook, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/technology/india-elections-facebook.html 
[https://perma.cc/55AW-X6Q3]. 
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As these scenarios suggest, the threats posed by deep fakes have systemic 
dimensions. The damage may extend to, among other things, distortion of 
democratic discourse on important policy questions; manipulation of elections; 
erosion of trust in significant public and private institutions; enhancement and 
exploitation of social divisions; harm to specific military or intelligence 
operations or capabilities; threats to the economy; and damage to international 
relations. 
a. Distortion of Democratic Discourse 
Public discourse on questions of policy currently suffers from the 
circulation of false information.110 Sometimes lies are intended to undermine the 
credibility of participants in such debates, and sometimes lies erode the factual 
foundation that ought to inform policy discourse. Even without prevalent deep 
fakes, information pathologies abound. But deep fakes will exacerbate matters 
by raising the stakes for the “fake news” phenomenon in dramatic fashion (quite 
literally).111 
Many actors will have sufficient interest to exploit the capacity of deep 
fakes to skew information and thus manipulate beliefs. As recent actions by the 
Russian government demonstrate, state actors sometimes have such interests.112 
Other actors will do it as a form of unfair competition in the battle of ideas. And 
others will do it simply as a tactic of intellectual vandalism and fraud. The 
combined effects may be significant, including but not limited to the disruption 
of elections. But elections are vulnerable to deep fakes in a separate and 
distinctive way as well, as we will explore in the next section. 
Democratic discourse is most functional when debates build from a 
foundation of shared facts and truths supported by empirical evidence.113 In the 
absence of an agreed upon reality, efforts to solve national and global problems 
become enmeshed in needless first-order questions like whether climate change 
is real.114 The large-scale erosion of public faith in data and statistics has led us 
 
 110. See Steve Lohr, It’s True: False News Spreads Faster and Wider. And Humans Are to 
Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/technology/twitter-fake-
news-research.html [https://perma.cc/AB74-CUWV]. 
 111. Franklin Foer, The Era of Fake Video Begins, ATLANTIC (May 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/realitys-end/556877 [https://perma.cc/RX2A-
X8EE] (“Fabricated videos will create new and understandable suspicions about everything we watch. 
Politicians and publicists will exploit those doubts. When captured in a moment of wrongdoing, a culprit 
will simply declare the visual evidence a malicious concoction.”). 
 112. Charlie Warzel, 2017 Was the Year Our Internet Destroyed Our Shared Reality, BUZZFEED 
(Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/2017-year-the-Internet-destroyed-shared-
reality?utm_term=.nebaDjYmj [https://perma.cc/8WWS-UC8K]. 
 113. Mark Verstraete & Derek E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
129, 152 (2017). For powerful scholarship on how lies undermine culture of trust, see SEANA 
VALENTINE SHRIFFIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2014). 
 114. Verstraete & Bambauer, supra note 113, at 144 (“Trust in data and statistics is a precondition 
to being able to resolve disputes about the world—they allow participants in policy debates to operate 
at least from a shared reality.”). 
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to a point where the simple introduction of empirical evidence can alienate those 
who have come to view statistics as elitist.115 Deep fakes will allow individuals 
to live in their own subjective realities, where beliefs can be supported by 
manufactured “facts.” When basic empirical insights provoke heated 
contestation, democratic discourse has difficulty proceeding. In a marketplace of 
ideas flooded with deep-fake videos and audio, truthful facts will have difficulty 
emerging from the scrum. 
b. Manipulation of Elections 
In addition to the ability of deep fakes to inject visual and audio falsehoods 
into policy debates, a deeply convincing variation of a long-standing problem in 
politics, deep fakes can enable a particularly disturbing form of sabotage: 
distribution of a damaging, but false, video or audio about a political candidate. 
The potential to sway the outcome of an election is real, particularly if the 
attacker is able to time the distribution such that there will be enough window 
for the fake to circulate but not enough window for the victim to debunk it 
effectively (assuming it can be debunked at all). In this respect, the election 
scenario is akin to the NBA draft scenario described earlier. Both involve 
decisional chokepoints: narrow windows of time during which irrevocable 
decisions are made, and during which the circulation of false information 
therefore may have irremediable effects. 
The 2017 election in France illustrates the perils. In this variant of the 
operation executed against the Clinton campaign in the United States in 2016, 
the Russians mounted a covert-action program that blended cyber-espionage and 
information manipulation in an effort to prevent the election of Emmanuel 
Macron as President of France in 2017.116 The campaign included theft of large 
numbers of digital communications and documents, alteration of some of those 
documents in hopes of making them seem problematic, and dumping a lot of 
them on the public alongside aggressive spin. The effort ultimately fizzled for 
many reasons, including: poor tradecraft that made it easy to trace the attack; 
smart defensive work by the Macron team, which planted their own false 
documents throughout their own system to create a smokescreen of distrust; a 
lack of sufficiently provocative material despite an effort by the Russians to 
engineer scandal by altering some of the documents prior to release; and 
mismanagement of the timing of the document dump, which left enough time for 
the Macron team and the media to discover and point out all these flaws.117 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Aurelien Breeden et al., Macron Campaign Says It Was Target of ‘Massive’ Hacking 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/france-macron-
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 117. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter et al., Hackers Came, But the French Were Prepared, N.Y. TIMES 
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It was a bullet dodged, yes, but a bullet nonetheless. The Russians could 
have acted with greater care, both in terms of timing and tradecraft. They could 
have produced a more-damning fake document, for example, dropping it just as 
polls opened. Worse, they could have distributed a deep fake consisting of 
seemingly-real video or audio evidence persuasively depicting Macron speaking 
or doing something shocking. 
This version of the deep-fake threat is not limited to state-sponsored covert 
action. States may have a strong incentive to develop and deploy such tools to 
sway elections, but there will be no shortage of non-state actors and individuals 
motivated to do the same. The limitation on such interventions has much more 
to do with means than motive, as things currently stand. The diffusion of the 
capacity to produce high-quality deep fakes will erode that limitation, 
empowering an ever-widening circle of participants to inject false-but-
compelling information into a ready and willing information-sharing 
environment. If executed and timed well enough, such interventions are bound 
to tip an outcome sooner or later—and in a larger set of cases they will at least 
cast a shadow of illegitimacy over the election process itself. 
c. Eroding Trust in Institutions 
Deep fakes will erode trust in a wide range of both public and private 
institutions and such trust will become harder to maintain. The list of public 
institutions for which this will matter runs the gamut, including elected officials, 
appointed officials, judges, juries, legislators, staffers, and agencies. One can 
readily imagine, in the current climate especially, a fake-but-viral video 
purporting to show FBI special agents discussing ways to abuse their authority 
to pursue a Trump family member. Conversely, we might see a fraudulent video 
of ICE officers speaking with racist language about immigrants or acting cruelly 
towards a detained child. Particularly where strong narratives of distrust already 
exist, provocative deep fakes will find a primed audience. 
Private sector institutions will be just as vulnerable. If an institution has a 
significant voice or role in society, whether nationally or locally, it is a potential 
target. More to the point, such institutions already are subject to reputational 
attacks, but soon will have to face abuse in the form of deep fakes that are harder 
to debunk and more likely to circulate widely. Religious institutions are an 
obvious target, as are politically-engaged entities ranging from Planned 
Parenthood to the NRA.118 
 
 118. Recall that the Center for Medical Progress released videos of Planned Parenthood officials 
that Planned Parenthood argued had been deceptively edited to embarrass the organization. See, e.g., 
Jackie Calmes, Planned Parenthood Videos Were Altered, Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/us/abortion-planned-parenthood-videos.html 
[https://perma.cc/G52X-V8ND]. Imagine the potential for deep fakes designed for such a purpose. 
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d. Exacerbating Social Divisions 
The institutional examples relate closely to significant cleavages in 
American society involving identity and policy commitments. Indeed, this is 
what makes institutions attractive targets for falsehoods. As divisions become 
entrenched, the likelihood that opponents will believe negative things about the 
other side—and that some will be willing to spread lies towards that end—
grows.119 However, institutions will not be the only ones targeted with deep 
fakes. We anticipate that deep fakes will reinforce and exacerbate the underlying 
social divisions that fueled them in the first place. 
Some have argued that this was the actual—or at least the original—goal 
of the Russian covert action program involving intervention in American politics 
in 2016. The Russians may have intended to enhance American social divisions 
as a general proposition, rendering us less capable of forming consensus on 
important policy questions and thus more distracted by internal squabbles.120 
Texas is illustrative.121 Russia promoted conspiracy theories about federal 
military power during the innocuous, “Jade Helm” training exercises.122 Russian 
operators organized an event in Houston to protest radical Islam and a counter-
protest of that event;123 they also promoted a Texas independence movement.124 
Deep fakes will strengthen the hand of those who seek to divide us in this way. 
Deep fakes will not merely add fuel to the fire sustaining divisions. In some 
instances, the emotional punch of a fake video or audio might accomplish a 
degree of mobilization-to-action that written words alone could not.125 Consider 
 
 119. See Brian E. Weeks, Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety 
Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation, 65 J. COMM. 699, 
711–15 (2015) (discussing how political actors can spread political misinformation by recognizing and 
exploiting common human emotional states). 
 120. JON WHITE, DISMISS, DISTORT, DISTRACT, AND DISMAY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN 
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION (Inst. for European Studies ed. 2016), https://www.ies.be/node/3689 
[https://perma.cc/P889-768J]. 
 121. The CalExit campaign is another illustration of Russian disinformation campaign. ‘Russian 
Trolls’ Promoted California Independence, BBC (Nov. 4, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-
trending-41853131 [https://perma.cc/68Q8-KNDG]. 
 122. Cassandra Pollock & Alex Samuels, Hysteria Over Jade Helm Exercise in Texas Was 
Fueled by Russians, Former CIA Director Says, TEX. TRIB. (May 3, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/03/hysteria-over-jade-helm-exercise-texas-was-fueled-russians-
former-cia [https://perma.cc/BU2Y-E7EY]. 
 123. Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered Russian Operatives Online, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/us/politics/russian-operatives-facebook-
twitter.html [https://perma.cc/4C8Y-STP7]. 
 124. Casey Michel, How the Russians Pretended to Be Texans—And Texans Believed Them, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-
post/wp/2017/10/17/how-the-russians-pretended-to-be-texans-and-texans-believed-
them/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4730a395a684 [https://perma.cc/3Q7V-8YZK]. 
 125. The “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory is a perfect example. There, an individual stormed a D.C. 
restaurant with a gun because online stories falsely claimed that Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
ran a child sex exploitation ring out of its basement. See Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, to 
Hashtag, to Gunfire in D.C., WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), 
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a situation of fraught, race-related tensions involving a police force and a local 
community. A sufficiently inflammatory deep fake depicting a police officer 
using racial slurs, shooting an unarmed person, or both could set off substantial 
civil unrest, riots, or worse. Of course, the same deep fake might be done in 
reverse, falsely depicting a community leader calling for violence against the 
police. Such events would impose intangible costs by sharpening societal 
divisions, as well as tangible costs for those tricked into certain actions and those 
suffering from those actions. 
e. Undermining Public Safety 
The foregoing example illustrates how a deep fake might be used to 
enhance social divisions and to spark actions—even violence—that fray our 
social fabric. But note, too, how deep fakes can undermine public safety. 
A century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes warned of the danger of 
falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater.126 Now, false cries in the form of deep 
fakes go viral, fueled by the persuasive power of hyper-realistic evidence in 
conjunction with the distribution powers of social media.127 The panic and 
damage Holmes imagined may be modest in comparison to the potential unrest 
and destruction created by a well-timed deep fake.128 
In the best-case scenario, real public panic might simply entail economic 
harms and hassles. In the worst-case scenario, it might involve property 
destruction, personal injuries, and/or death. Deep fakes increase the chances that 
someone can induce a public panic. 
They might not even need to capitalize on social divisions to do so. In early 
2018, we saw a glimpse of how a panic might be caused through ordinary human 




 126. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic.”). 
 127. Cass R, Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 365 (1996) (“It may 
well be that the easy transmission of such material to millions of people will justify deference to 
reasonable legislative judgments.”). 
 128. In our keynote at the University of Maryland Law Review symposium inspired by this 
article, we brought the issue close to home (for one of us) in Baltimore—the death of Freddie Gray while 
he was in policy custody. We asked the audience: “Imagine if a deep-fake video appeared of the police 
officers responsible for Mr. Gray’s death in which they said they were ordered to kill Mr. Gray. As most 
readers know, the day after Mr. Gray’s death was characterized by protests and civil unrest. If such a 
deep-fake video had appeared and gone viral, we might have seen far more violence and disruption in 
Baltimore. If the timing was just right and the video sufficiently inflammatory, we might have seen 
greater destruction of property and possibly of lives.” Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st 
Century Style Truth Decay: Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National 
Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 887 (2019); see also Maryland Carey Law, Truth Decay– Maryland Law 
Review Keynote Symposium Address, YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrYlKHiWv2c [https://perma.cc/T28M-ZBBN]. 
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warning to the public about an incoming ballistic missile.129 Less widely noted, 
we saw purposeful attempts to induce panic when the Russian Internet Research 
Agency mounted a sophisticated and well-resourced campaign to create the 
appearance of a chemical disaster in Louisiana and an Ebola outbreak in 
Atlanta.130 There was real but limited harm in both of these cases, though the 
stories did not spread far because they lacked evidence and the facts were easy 
to check. 
We will not always be so lucky as malicious attempts to spread panic grow. 
Deep fakes will prove especially useful for such disinformation campaigns, 
enhancing their credibility. Imagine if the Atlanta Ebola story had been backed 
by compelling fake audio appearing to capture a phone conversation with the 
head of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describing terrifying 
facts and calling for a cover-up to keep the public calm. 
f. Undermining Diplomacy 
Deep fakes will also disrupt diplomatic relations and roil international 
affairs, especially where the fake is circulated publicly and galvanizes public 
opinion. The recent Saudi-Qatari crisis might have been fueled by a hack that 
injected fake stories with fake quotes by Qatar’s emir into a Qatari news site.131 
The manipulator behind the lie could then further support the fraud with 
convincing video and audio clips purportedly gathered by and leaked from some 
unnamed intelligence agency. 
A deep fake put into the hands of a state’s intelligence apparatus may or 
may not prompt a rash action. After all, the intelligence agencies of the most 
capable governments are in a good position to make smart decisions about what 
weight to give potential fakes. But not every state has such capable institutions, 
and, in any event, the real utility of a deep fake for purposes of sparking an 
international incident lies in inciting the public in one or more states to believe 
that something shocking really did occur or was said. Deep fakes thus might best 
be used to box in a government through inflammation of relevant public opinion, 
constraining the government’s options, and perhaps forcing its hand in some 
particular way. Recalling the concept of decisional chokepoints, for example, a 
well-timed deep fake calculated to inflame public opinion might be circulated 
during a summit meeting, making it politically untenable for one side to press its 
 
 129. Cecilia Kang, Hawaii Missile Alert Wasn’t Accidental, Officials Say, Blaming Worker, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/technology/fcc-hawaii-missile-alert.html 
[https://perma.cc/4M39-C492]. 
 130. Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html [https://perma.cc/DML3-6MWT]. 
 131. Krishnadev Calamur, Did Russian Hackers Target Qatar?, ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/qatar-russian-hacker-fake-news/529359 
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agenda as it otherwise would have, or making it too costly to reach and announce 
some particular agreement. 
g. Jeopardizing National Security 
The use of deep fakes to endanger public safety or disrupt international 
relations can also be viewed as harming national security. But what else belongs 
under that heading? 
Military activity—especially combat operations—belongs under this 
heading as well, and there is considerable utility for deep fakes in that setting. 
Most obviously, deep fakes have utility as a form of disinformation supporting 
strategic, operational, or even tactical deception. This is a familiar aspect of 
warfare, famously illustrated by the efforts of the Allies in Operation Bodyguard 
to mislead the Axis regarding the location of what became the D-Day invasion 
of June 1944.132 In that sense, deep fakes will be (or already are) merely another 
instrument in the toolkit for wartime deception, one that combatants will both 
use and have used against them. 
Critically, deep fakes may prove to have special impact when it comes to 
the battle for hearts and minds where a military force is occupying or at least 
operating amidst a civilian population, as was the case for the U.S. military for 
many years in Iraq and even now in Afghanistan. In that context, we have long 
seen contending claims about civilian casualties—including, at times, the use of 
falsified evidence to that effect. Deep fakes are certain to be used to make such 
claims more credible. At times, this will merely have a general impact in the 
larger battle of narratives. Nevertheless, such general impacts can matter a great 
deal in the long term and can spur enemy recruitment or enhance civilian support 
to the enemy. And, at times, it will spark specific violent reactions. One can 
imagine circulation of a deep-fake video purporting to depict American soldiers 
killing local civilians and seeming to say disparaging things about Islam in the 
process, precipitating an attack by civilians or even a host-state soldier or police 
officer against nearby U.S. persons. 
Deep fakes pose similar problems for the activities of intelligence agencies. 
The experience of the United States since the Snowden leaks in 2013 
demonstrates that the public, both in the United States and abroad, can become 
very alarmed about reports that the U.S. Intelligence Community has a particular 
capability, and this can translate into significant pressure to limit or abolish that 
capability both from an internal U.S. perspective and in terms of diplomatic 
relations. Whether those pressures resulted in changes that went too far in the 
case of the Snowden revelations is not our concern here. Our point is that this 
dynamic could be exploited if one wished to create distractions for an 
 
 132. Jamie Rubin, Deception: the Other ‘D’ in D-Day, NBC NEWS: THE ABRAMS REPORT (June 
5, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5139053/ns/msnbc-the_abrams_report/t/deception-other-d-d-
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intelligence agency or generate conditions that would lead a society to limit what 
that agency is authorized to do. None of that would be easily done, but deep fakes 
make the prospect of a strategic operation to bedevil a competing state’s 
intelligence services more plausible.133 
The list of potential national security harms associated with deep fakes can 
go on, depending on one’s definition of national security. In a recent report, the 
Belfer Center highlighted the national security implications of sophisticated 
forgeries.134 An adversary could acquire real and sensitive documents through 
cyber-espionage and release the real documents along with forgeries. Deep-fake 
video and audio could be “leaked” to verify the forgeries. Foreign policy could 
be changed in response to convincing deep fakes and forgeries.135 
h. Undermining Journalism 
As the capacity to produce deep fakes spreads, journalists increasingly will 
encounter a dilemma: when someone provides video or audio evidence of a 
newsworthy event, can its authenticity be trusted? That is not a novel question, 
but it will be harder to answer as deep fakes proliferate. News organizations may 
be chilled from rapidly reporting real, disturbing events for fear that the evidence 
of them will turn out to be fake.136 
It is not just a matter of honest mistakes becoming more frequent: one can 
expect instances in which someone tries to trap a news organization using deep 
fakes. We already have seen many examples of “stings” pursued without the 
benefit of deep-fake technology.137 Convincing deep fakes will make such stings 
more likely to succeed. Media entities may grow less willing to take risks in that 
 
 133. In this context, it is interesting to note the success of the Shadow Brokers operation, which 
appears to have been a Russian effort not just to steal capabilities from NSA but to embarrass the NSA 
through a series of taunting public releases of those capabilities. There was also some degree of 
accompanying spin suggesting an interest in sowing doubt both in the U.S. and abroad about the wisdom 
of allowing the NSA to develop, keep, and use such capabilities in the first place. See Scott Shane, et al., 
Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/nsa-shadow-brokers.html [https://perma.cc/WF6U-D4SV]. 
 134. GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L 
AFF., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (July 2017), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4H5-QLVC]. 
 135. Id. at 34. 
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Online, POYNTER (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/news/us-newsrooms-are-largely-
unprepared-address-misinformation-online [https://perma.cc/XUF4-8LLM]. 
 137. See, e.g., Shawn Boburg, et al., A Woman Approached the Post With Dramatic—and 
False—Tale About Roy Moore. She Appears to Be Part of Undercover Sting Operation, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/a-woman-approached-the-post-with-
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operation/2017/11/27/0c2e335a-cfb6-11e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html?utm_term=.6a4e98a07c2c 
[https://perma.cc/3TKD-27BP] (discussing an attempt to trick the Washington Post into running a false 
story about a woman claiming to have had sex as a teenager with and become pregnant by then-U.S. 
Senate candidate Roy Moore). 
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environment, or at least less willing to do so in timely fashion. Without a quick 
and reliable way to authenticate video and audio, the press may find it difficult 
to fulfill its ethical and moral obligation to spread truth. 
i. The Liar’s Dividend: Beware the Cry of Deep-Fake News 
We conclude our survey of the harms associated with deep fakes by 
flagging another possibility, one different in kind from those noted above. In 
each of the preceding examples, the harm stems directly from the use of a deep 
fake to convince people that fictional things really occurred. But not all lies 
involve affirmative claims that something occurred (that never did): some of the 
most dangerous lies take the form of denials. 
Deep fakes will make it easier for liars to deny the truth in distinct ways. A 
person accused of having said or done something might create doubt about the 
accusation by using altered video or audio evidence that appears to contradict 
the claim. This would be a high-risk strategy, though less so in situations where 
the media is not involved and where no one else seems likely to have the 
technical capacity to expose the fraud. In situations of resource-inequality, we 
may see deep fakes used to escape accountability for the truth. 
Deep fakes will prove useful in escaping the truth in another equally 
pernicious way. Ironically, liars aiming to dodge responsibility for their real 
words and actions will become more credible as the public becomes more 
educated about the threats posed by deep fakes. Imagine a situation in which an 
accusation is supported by genuine video or audio evidence. As the public 
becomes more aware of the idea that video and audio can be convincingly faked, 
some will try to escape accountability for their actions by denouncing authentic 
video and audio as deep fakes. Put simply: a skeptical public will be primed to 
doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence. This skepticism can be 
invoked just as well against authentic as against adulterated content. 
Hence what we call the liar’s dividend: this dividend flows, perversely, in 
proportion to success in educating the public about the dangers of deep fakes. 
The liar’s dividend would run with the grain of larger trends involving truth 
skepticism. Most notably, recent years have seen mounting distrust of traditional 
sources of news. That distrust has been stoked relentlessly by President Trump 
and like-minded sources in television and radio; the mantra “fake news” has 
become an instantly recognized shorthand for a host of propositions about the 
supposed corruption and bias of a wide array of journalists, and a useful 
substitute for argument when confronted with damaging factual assertions. 
Whether one labels this collection of attitudes postmodernist or nihilist,138 the 
 
 138. For a useful summary of that debate, see Thomas B. Edsall, Is President Trump a Stealth 
Postmodernist or Just a Liar?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), 
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fact remains that it has made substantial inroads into public opinion in recent 
years. 
Against that backdrop, it is not difficult to see how “fake news” will extend 
to “deep-fake news” in the future. As deep fakes become widespread, the public 
may have difficulty believing what their eyes or ears are telling them—even 
when the information is real. In turn, the spread of deep fakes threatens to erode 
the trust necessary for democracy to function effectively.139 
The combination of truth decay and trust decay accordingly creates greater 
space for authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes and leaders with authoritarian 
tendencies benefit when objective truths lose their power.140 If the public loses 
faith in what they hear and see and truth becomes a matter of opinion, then power 
flows to those whose opinions are most prominent—empowering authorities 
along the way.141 
Cognitive bias will reinforce these unhealthy dynamics. As Part II explored, 
people tend to believe facts that accord with our preexisting beliefs.142 As 
research shows, people often ignore information that contradicts their beliefs and 
interpret ambiguous evidence as consistent with their beliefs.143 People are also 
inclined to accept information that pleases them when given the choice.144 
Growing appreciation that deep fakes exist may provide a convenient excuse for 
motivated reasoners to embrace these dynamics, even when confronted with 
information that is in fact true. 
III. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE?  EVALUATING TECHNICAL, LEGAL, AND MARKET 
RESPONSES 
What can be done to ameliorate these harms? Part III reviews various 
possibilities. To start, we explore the prospects for technological solutions that 
would facilitate the detection and debunking of deep fakes. We then describe 
 
 139. The Edelman Trust Barometer, which measures trust in institutions around the world, 
recorded a drop of nine points in the Trust Index for the United States from 2017 to 2018. Even among 
the informed public, the US dropped from a Trust Index of 68 to 45. 2018 EDELMAN TRUST 
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current and potential proposals for criminal and civil liability. With law in mind, 
we discuss the role of regulators and identify ways in which the government 
might respond to deep fakes. In the shadow of these possibilities, we anticipate 
new services the market might spawn to protect individuals from harm associated 
with deep fakes—and the considerable threat to privacy such services themselves 
might entail. 
A. Technological Solutions 
Technology has given us deep fakes – but might it also provide us with a 
capacity for debunking them and limiting their harmful potential? An efficient 
and generally effective method for rapid detection of deep fakes would go far 
toward resolving this topic as a matter of pressing public-policy concern. 
Unfortunately, the challenges are daunting. For example, detection software 
would have to keep pace with innovations in deep-fake technology to retain 
efficacy. Moreover, if such technology existed and could be deployed through 
social media platforms, it would only reduce the systemic harms described 
above, but by no means eliminate them. Such developments might not protect 
individuals from deep fakes involving narrow or even isolated distribution.145 
Further, detection software might not disabuse certain people’s faith in deep 
fakes, especially those under the profound sway of cognitive bias. At the least 
though, the impact of harmful deep fakes might be cabined while beneficial uses 
could continue unabated. 
At any rate, it is far from clear that such technology will emerge in the near 
future. There are a number of projects—academic and corporate—aimed at 
creating counterfeit-proof systems for authenticating content or otherwise 
making it easier to confirm credible provenance.146 Such systems, however, are 
tailored to particular products rather than video or audio technologies generally. 
They will therefore have only limited use until one program becomes ubiquitous 
and effective enough for dominant platforms to incorporate them into their 
content-screening systems—and, indeed, to make use of them mandatory for 
posting. Additionally, these systems will have to withstand users’ efforts to 
bypass them. 
For now, we are left to seek a generally applicable technology that can 
detect manipulated content without an expectation that the content comes with 
 
 145. GIF hosting company Gyfcat has developed and trained AI to spot fraudulent videos. Project 
Maru, as they call it, can spot deep-fake videos because in many frames, the faces aren’t perfectly 
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https://www.wired.com/story/gfycat-artificial-intelligence-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/PX4N-VZJY]. 
 146. For examples of provenance technologies in development, see Dia Kayyali, Set Your Phone 
to ProofMode, WITNESS, https://blog.witness.org/2017/04/proofmode-helping-prove-human-rights-
abuses-world [https://perma.cc/GB6M-KQPF] (describing the concept of a metadata-rich “ProofMode” 
app for Android devices). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 
1788 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:1753 
an internal certification. Professor Hany Farid, the pioneer of PhotoDNA, a 
technology that identifies and blocks child pornography, warns: “We’re decades 
away from having forensic technology that . . . [could] conclusively tell a real 
from a fake . . . If you really want to fool the system you will start building into 
the deepfake ways to break the forensic system.”147 The defense, in short, is 
currently faring poorly in the deep-fake technology arms race. 
As problems associated with deep fakes begin to accumulate, we might 
expect developments that could alter the current balance of power between 
technologies that create deep fakes and those that detect them. For example, 
growing awareness of the problem might produce the conditions needed for 
grantmaking agencies like the National Science Foundation and the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to begin steering funds toward 
scalable detection systems that can be commercialized or even provided freely. 
DARPA has an initial project in the form of a contest pitting GAN methods for 
generating deep fakes against would-be detection algorithms. The DARPA 
project manager is skeptical about the prospects for detection, however, given 
current technical capacities.148 
Emerging market forces might encourage companies to invest in such 
capabilities on their own or in collaboration with each other and with academics 
(a possibility that we revisit below). For now, however, it would be foolish to 
trust that technology will deliver a debunking solution that is scalable and 
reliable enough to minimize the harms deep fakes might cause. 
B. Legal Solutions 
If technology alone will not save us, might the law? Would a combination 
of criminal and civil liability meaningfully deter and redress the harms that deep 
fakes seem poised to cause? We examine the possibilities under existing and 
potential law. 
1. Problems with an Outright Ban 
No current criminal law or civil liability regime bans the creation or 
distribution of deep fakes. A threshold question is whether such a law would be 
normatively appealing and, if so, constitutionally permissible. 
A flat ban is not desirable because digital manipulation is not inherently 
problematic. Deep fakes exact significant harm in certain contexts but not in all. 
A prohibition of deep fakes would bar routine modifications that improve the 
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military-is-funding-an-effort-to-catch-deepfakes-and-other-ai-trickery [https://perma.cc/7RD7-5CMJ] 
(“‘Theoretically, if you gave a GAN all the techniques we know to detect it, it could pass all of those 
techniques,’ says David Gunning, the DARPA program manager in charge of the project. ‘We don’t 
know if there’s a limit. It’s unclear.’”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 
2019] DEEP FAKES 1789 
clarity of digital content. It would chill experimentation in diverse fields, from 
history and science to art and education. 
Crafting a law prohibiting destructive applications of deep-fake technology 
while excluding beneficial ones would be difficult, but perhaps not impossible. 
For example, what if a law required proof of a deep-fake creator’s intent to 
deceive and evidence of serious harm as a way to reduce concerns about chilling 
public discourse? Under such a proposal, concerns over speech still remain. The 
very existence of a general prohibition of deep fakes, even with those guardrails, 
would cast a significant shadow, potentially diminishing expression crucial to 
self-governance and democratic culture. The American free speech tradition 
warns against government having the power to pick winners and losers in the 
realm of ideas because it will “tend to act on behalf of the ideological powers 
that be.”149 As James Weinstein notes, we should be especially wary of 
entrusting government officials with the power to determine the veracity of 
factual claims “made in the often highly ideological context of public 
discourse . . . .”150 A deep-fakes ban would raise the specter of penalties for 
parodies of would-be or current office holders. 
Although self-serving prosecutions are not inevitable, they are a real 
possibility.151 Dislike of minority or unpopular viewpoints, combined with 
ambiguity surrounding a deep-fake creator’s intent, might result in politicized 
enforcement.152 This might inhibit engagement in political discourse 
 
 149. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The 
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 302 (1989); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he forefathers did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us.”). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned against the human 
inclination to silence opinions that we dislike. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe . . . .”). “Persecution for the expression of opinions[,]” he wrote, is “perfectly 
logical . . . [i]f you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart . . . .” Id. Holmes offered against this certainty, and power’s tendency to sweep away disagreement, 
a principle of epistemic doubt that is a defining hallmark of First Amendment law. See id. 
 150. James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizens Competence, and the First 
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 351 (2018). 
 151. Indeed, public officials recently have called for a rethinking of libel laws. Alex Pappas, 
Trump: ‘Our Current Libel Laws Are a Sham’, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-our-current-libel-laws-are-a-sham [https://perma.cc/AHM4-
UN6G]; Gregg Re, Clarence Thomas Backs Trump’s Call for Changing Defamation Law for Easing 
Suits Against the Media, FOX NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/clarence-
thomas-calls-for-easing-defamation-suits-by-politicians-like-trump [https://perma.cc/RN42-DFCK]. 
Although this suggestion may seem untenable given the U.S. commitment to robust and wide-open 
debate on public issues, it animates concerns about partisan enforcement. 
 152. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 351 (“There is even greater reason to distrust the ability of 
government officials to fairly and accurately determine the speaker’s state of mind in making allegedly 
false statement.”). James Weinstein explains that “government officials hostile to the speaker’s point of 
view are more likely to believe that the speaker knew that the statement was false, while officials who 
share the speaker’s ideological perspective will be more likely to find that any misstatement of fact was 
an innocent one.” Id. 
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specifically, and in democratic culture more generally.153 The “‘risk of 
censorious selectivity by prosecutors’” [will] . . . distort perspectives made 
available” to the public.154 It is far better to forego an outright ban of deep fakes 
than to run the risk of its abuse. 
Even if these normative concerns could be overcome, it is unlikely that a 
flat ban on deep fakes could withstand constitutional challenge. Deep fakes 
implicate freedom of expression, even though they involve intentionally false 
statements.155 In the landmark 1964 decision New York Times v. Sullivan,156 the 
Supreme Court held that false speech enjoys constitutional protection insofar as 
its prohibition would chill truthful speech.157 
In 2012, in United States v. Alvarez,158 the Court went even further. In the 
plurality and concurring opinions, the Court concluded that “falsity alone” does 
not remove expression from First Amendment protection.159 As Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality noted, falsehoods generally warrant protection because they 
inspire rebuttal and “reawaken respect” for valuable ideas in public discourse.160 
Central to this point is faith in the public’s willingness to counter lies and engage 
in reasoned discourse. 
While all nine Justices agreed that the harmful effect of false factual 
statements could be regulated, they differed in the particulars.161 The plurality 
opinion took the position that false statements can be proscribed if the speakers 
intended to cause “legally cognizable harm” of a kind traditionally understood 
as falling outside the First Amendment’s protection.162 The concurrence posited 
that a law aimed at regulating harm-causing falsehoods may be permissible if it 
 
 153. For Jack Balkin’s influential theory of free speech grounded in participation in democratic 
culture, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1053, 1072 (2016) (arguing that key to free society is ability to engage in meaning making and 
creation of culture). 
 154. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 360 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 155. See generally Lewis Sargentich, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970) (describing a judicial presumption against statutes that curtail a broad 
array of expressive activity). 
 156. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 157. Id. at 264. 
 158. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (plurality opinion). 
 159. Id. at 719. For a superb discussion of the constitutional significance of lies in the aftermath 
of Alvarez, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First 
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1440–54 (2015). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth 
Karst’s Equality as the Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008) 
(discussing a “two-level” theory of the First Amendment: one that treats high value speech with stringent 
protections, and a second tier of speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s coverage). 
 160. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719, 722 (“Indeed, the outrage and contempt expressed for respondent’s 
lies can serve to reawaken and reinforce the public’s respect for the Medal, its recipients, and its high 
purpose.”). 
 161. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion); id. at 731–34 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 750 (Alito, J. 
dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 719, 725 (plurality opinion). 
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does not disproportionately damage First Amendment interests.163 The dissent 
would have denied First Amendment protection to false factual statements that 
inflict harm and serve no legitimate purpose.164 The court reached consensus that 
regulation of false statements involving history, politics, literature, and other 
matters of public concern requires strict scrutiny review.165 
The opinions in Alvarez, taken together, would seem to preclude a 
sweeping ban on deep fakes while leaving considerable room for carefully 
tailored prohibitions of certain harmful deep fakes. As the plurality underscored 
in Alvarez, certain categories of speech are not covered by the First Amendment 
due to their propensity to bring about serious harms and their slight contribution 
to free speech values.166 Some deep fakes will fall into those categories and thus 
could be subject to regulation. This includes defamation of private persons, 
fraud, true threats, and the imminent-and-likely incitement of violence.167 
Speech integral to criminal conduct like extortion, blackmail, and perjury has 
long been understood to enjoy no First Amendment protection.168 
Consider as an illustration laws banning the impersonation of government 
officials (such as law enforcement officers or agency officials). As Helen Norton 
insightfully explains, these statutes are “largely uncontroversial as a First 
Amendment matter in great part because they address real (if often intangible) 
harm to the public as well as to the individual target.”169 Lies about the source of 
speech—whether a public official is actually speaking—do not serve free speech 
values.170 Quite the opposite, they deny listeners the ability to assess the quality 
and credibility of the speech, undermining democratic self-governance and the 
search for truth.171 From a normative perspective, therefore, a surgical approach 
 
 163. Id. at 737 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 164. Id. at 750 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J. plurality); id. at 734 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 751 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). For an insightful exploration of Alvarez and its implications for the regulation of deep fakes, 
see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 110 (2018) 
(arguing that government should have greater power to regulate forgeries than the malicious statement 
of false facts); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Deep Fakes and Other Non-Testimonial Falsehoods: When Is Belief 
Manipulation (Not) First Amendment Speech? (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors) (arguing that deep fakes may fall outside of First Amendment coverage because they arguably 
amount to non-testimonial evidence and change perceptions of the world around them, especially where 
government seeks to require disclosure that something is a deep fake). 
 166. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 199–218 
(discussing narrow categories of low-value speech accorded less rigorous protection or no protection 
under First Amendment analysis). 
 167. See Chen & Marceau, supra note 159, at 1480–91. 
 168. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 203–05 (explaining that crime-
facilitating speech does not enjoy First Amendment protection in context of cyber stalking). 
 169. Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in 
LAW AND LIES 143, 170 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) [hereinafter Norton, Lies to Manipulate]. 
 170. Id. at 168. We are grateful to both Helen Norton and Marc Blitz who generously spent time 
talking to us about the doctrinal and theoretical free speech issues raised in regulating deep fakes. 
 171. Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117, 
131 (2018). 
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to criminal and civil liability may result in a more attractive balance of costs and 
benefits than a deep-fake ban perspective. And so we turn now to a discussion 
of specific possibilities, starting with civil liability. 
2. Specific Categories of Civil Liability 
Given that deep fakes cannot and should not be banned on a generalized 
basis, the question remains whether their creators and distributors in particular 
contexts should be subject to civil liability for the harms they cause. This section 
reviews relevant existing laws and possible improvements. 
a. Threshold Obstacles 
Before reviewing the prospects for particular theories of liability, we note 
two threshold problems. 
The first involves attribution. Civil liability cannot ameliorate harms caused 
by deep fakes if plaintiffs cannot tie them to their creators. The attribution 
problem arises in the first instance because the metadata relevant for ascertaining 
a deep fake’s provenance might be insufficient to identify the person who 
generated it. It arises again when the creator or someone else posts a deep fake 
on social media or otherwise injects it into the marketplace of information. A 
careful distributor of a deep fake may take pains to be anonymous, including but 
not limited to using technologies like Tor.172 When these technologies are 
employed, the IP addresses connected to posts may be impossible to find and 
trace back to the responsible parties.173 In such cases, a person or entity aggrieved 
by a deep fake may have no practical recourse against its creator, leaving only 
the possibility of seeking a remedy from the owner of platforms that enabled 
circulation of the content. 
A second obstacle arises when the creator of the deep fake—or the platform 
circulating it—is outside the United States and thus beyond the effective reach 
of US legal process, or in a jurisdiction where local legal action is unlikely to be 
effective. Therefore, even if attribution is known, it still may be impossible to 
use civil remedies effectively. While limitations of civil liability exist in many 
settings, the global nature of online platforms makes it a particular problem in 
the deep-fake context. 
Moreover, regardless of whether perpetrators can be identified or reside in 
the US, civil suits are expensive. Victims usually bear the heavy costs of bringing 
civil claims and may be hesitant to initiate lawsuits if deep-fake generators are 
 
 172. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 142–43 (arguing that law has 
difficulty communicating norms, deterring unlawful activity, or redressing injuries if defendants have 
used anonymizing technologies that make it difficult to identity them). 
 173. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 117 (explaining that claims cannot be pressed 
against cyber stalkers if websites hosting their abuse fails to track IP addresses). 
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effectively judgment-proof.174 Worse, the “Streisand Effect” is likely to 
overhang the decision to sue when the deep fake is embarrassing or 
reputationally harmful. Lawsuits attract publicity; unless the victim is permitted 
to sue under a pseudonym, filing a claim may exacerbate the victim’s harm.175 
b. Suing the Creators of Deep Fakes 
Threshold attribution and liability hurdles are not always fatal for would-
be plaintiffs. When a victim decides to sue the creator of a deep fake, several 
bodies of law come into play, including intellectual property and tort law. 
First, consider copyright law. Some deep fakes exploit copyrighted content, 
opening the door to monetary damages and a notice-and-takedown procedure 
that can result in removal of the offending content.176 A copyright owner is the 
person who took a photograph. Thus, if a deep fake involves a photo that the 
victim took of herself, the victim might have a copyright claim against the creator 
of the deep fake.177 
The prospects for success, however, are uncertain. A court will have to 
determine whether the deep fake is a “fair use” of the copyrighted material, 
intended for educational, artistic, or other expressive purposes. Whether the fake 
is sufficiently transformed from the original to earn fair use protection is a highly 
fact-specific inquiry for which a judicial track record does not yet exist.178 
Tort law also includes concepts that could be used to address deep-fake 
scenarios. Most obviously, victims can sue for defamation. Where the alleged 
defamation concerns private individuals rather than public figures, states may 
permit plaintiffs to prevail based on a showing that the falsehood was made 
negligently.179 Public officials and public figures are subject to a higher 
requirement of showing clear and convincing evidence of actual malice—
knowledge or reckless disregard for the possibility that the deep fakes were 
 
 174. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 122 (exploring limits of civil 
law in redressing injuries resulting from cyber stalking). 
 175. Mike Masnick coined the phrase “the Streisand Effect” in Techdirt in 2005. Mike Masnick, 
Since When Is It Illegal to Just Mention a Trademark Online?, TECHDIRT (Jan. 5, 2005), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20050105/0132239_F.shtml [https://perma.cc/XR42-G9BX]. 
 176. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2065–67 (2014) (discussing the 
removal of copyright-infringing material). 
 177. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 122 (explaining that someone 
can sue for copyright of their own image only if they took the photos themselves); see also Megan 
Farokhmanesh, Is It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face Into Porn Without Consent?, VERGE (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/30/16945494/deepfakes-porn-face-swap-legal 
[https://perma.cc/TH4N-YUJV] (quoting Eric Goldman). 
 178. Compare David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have 
Them, EFF BLOG (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-laws-
faked-videos-we-already-have-them [https://perma.cc/KEG4-73L3] (noting that copyright claims may 
address deep fakes subject to fair use objections) with Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through 
the Right of Publicity, LAWFARE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/combatting-deep-
fakes-through-right-publicity [https://perma.cc/6TPH-98S9]. 
 179. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343–46 (1974). 
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false.180 In addition to defamation, the closely related tort of placing a person in 
a “false light”—or recklessly creating a harmful and false implication about 
someone in a public setting—has clear potential for the deep fake context.181 
Victims may also sue in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
This requires proof of “extreme and outrageous conduct.”182 Creating and 
circulating humiliating content like deep-fake sex videos would likely amount to 
“extreme and outrageous conduct” because it falls outside the norms of decency 
by most accounts.183 
Another prospect is the “right of publicity” in tort law, which permits 
compensation for the misappropriation of someone’s likeness for commercial 
gain.184 The commercial-gain element sharply limits the utility of this model: the 
harms associated with deep fakes do not typically generate direct financial gain 
for their creators.185 This is likely true, for example, of deep fakes posted to harm 
rivals or ex-lovers. Only in core cases, such as a business using deep-fake 
technology to make it seem a particular person endorsed their product or service, 
might this approach prove useful in stemming abuse. Further, the expressive 
value of some deep fakes may constitute a further hurdle to liability; courts often 
dismiss right of publicity claims concerning newsworthy matters on free-speech 
grounds.186 
Other privacy-focused torts seem relevant at first blush, yet are a poor fit 
on close inspection.187 The “public disclosure of private fact” tort, for example, 
allows individuals to recover for publication of private, “non-newsworthy” 
information that would highly offend the reasonable person.188 While deep fakes 
may meet the offense standard, using a person’s face in a deep-fake video does 
not amount to the disclosure of private information if the source image was 
publicly available.189 The “intrusion-on-seclusion” tort is likewise ill-suited to 
 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1969); see also CITRON, 
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 121, 132–34 (explaining the reach of defamation law 
in cases involving private individuals and public figures). 
 181. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 121, 132–34. 
 182. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 133–34, 140–41 (explaining 
that emotional distress claims are warranted for online abuse that is targeted, cruel, and reliant on 
sensitive embarrassing information, including nude photos). 
 183. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort 
Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011). 
 184. See generally JENNIFER F. ROTHMAN, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A 
PUBLIC WORLD (2018) (summarizing the history of the right of publicity tort). 
 185. See generally Lempel, supra note 178 (discussing how right to publicity claims would likely 
only succeed against misappropriations intended for commercial gain). 
 186. See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 184. 
 187. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 
1811–14 (2010) [hereinafter Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts] (exploring the limited application of 
privacy torts to twenty-first century privacy harms). 
 188. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 47 (4th ed. 
2017). 
 189. See id. at 42, 49. One of us (Citron) has explored the limits of privacy torts in context of 
deep-fake sex videos. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 93, at 1933–35. 
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the deep-fake scenario. It narrowly applies to defendants who “intruded into a 
private place, or . . . invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown 
about his person or affairs.”190 Deep-fakes usually will not involve invasions of 
spaces (either physical or conceptual like email inboxes) in which individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Therefore, current options for imposing liability on creators of deep fakes 
have mixed potential . Civil liability is most robust in relation to defamation, 
false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, with more limited 
prospects for copyright infringement and right of publicity claims. 
c. Suing the Platforms 
It will be challenging to achieve individualized accountability for harmful 
deep fakes, but creators are not the only parties that might bear responsibility. 
Given the key role that content platforms play in enabling the distribution of deep 
fakes, and the fact that creators of harmful deep fakes in some cases may be 
difficult to find and deter, the most efficient and effective way to mitigate harm 
may be to impose liability on platforms.191 In some contexts, this may be the only 
realistic possibility for deterrence and redress. 
Online platforms already have an incentive to screen content, thanks to the 
impact of moral suasion, market dynamics, and political pressures.192 They do 
not currently face significant civil liability risk for user-generated content, 
however, for the reasons explained below. 
In 1996, Congress provided platforms with a liability shield in the form of 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The law provided an 
immunity from liability to online platforms for hosting harmful content, albeit 
with an exception for content that violates federal criminal law, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, and intellectual property law.193 
Section 230 protects platforms in important ways. First, consider a situation 
in which an online platform displays content that links to another source (such 
as a news article or blog post) or is user-generated (such as a customer review 
 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1969). 
 191. See Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 187, at 1839–40. 
 192. See Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 46, at 1047–48; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 
93, at 1955–58 (examining Facebook’s developing strategy to address nonconsensual pornography in 
response to victims’ concerns brought to the company by advocacy groups such as the Cyber Civil 
Rights Initiative); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1616–30 (2018); see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 227–30 (exploring how and why content platforms moderate harmful 
content); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital 
Citizenship For Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1454–59 (2011) (describing varied steps 
platforms have taken to moderate digital hate, motivated by moral, business, and other instrumental 
concerns). One of us (Citron) is the Vice President of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and has advised 
social media platforms about concerns of cyber stalking victims for the past ten years, importantly 
without compensation. 
 193. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). See generally Citron & Wittes, supra note 46. 
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posted on Yelp). Now, imagine that the content is defamatory or otherwise 
actionable. Can the plaintiff sue the online platform that helped it see the light of 
day? Not under Section 230. Section 230(c)(1) expressly forbids treating the 
platform as a “publisher” or “speaker” of someone else’s problematic content. 
As courts have interpreted Section 230, online platforms enjoy immunity from 
liability for user-generated content even if they deliberately encouraged the 
posting of that content.194 
Next, consider a situation in which an online platform decides not to allow 
users to post whatever they wish, but to instead screen and block certain harmful 
content. Might the act of filtering become the basis of liability? If so, platforms 
might be loath to do any screening at all. Section 230(c)(2) was meant to remove 
the disincentive to self-regulation that liability otherwise might produce.195 
Simply put, it forbids civil suits against platforms based on the good-faith act of 
filtering to screen out offensive content, whether in the nature of obscenity, 
harassment, violence, or otherwise.196 
In crafting Section 230, the bill’s sponsors thought they were devising a 
safe harbor for online service providers that would enable the growth of the then-
emerging “Internet.”197 Representative Chris Cox, for example, became 
interested after reading about a trial court decision holding Prodigy, an online 
services company, liable as a publisher of defamatory comments because it tried 
but failed to filter profanity on its bulletin boards.198 A key goal of the legislation 
 
 194. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 408–09 (laying out judicial decisions interpreting 
Section 230 that have produced sweeping immunity from liability for user-generated content, including 
for sites that encourage users to post illegal content and sites that knowingly and deliberately repost 
illegal content); see also CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE, supra note 46 (same). In one 
example, Michael Herrick sued Grindr, a dating app, after the site refused to remove a user who was 
impersonating him on the app, sharing his nude images, claiming he had rape fantasies, and providing 
his home address. Herrick v. Grindr, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). More than 1,000 
men came to Herrick’s home demanding sex. Id. at 588. Grindr refused to address Herrick’s large 
number of complaints. Id. The district court dismissed the case on Section 230 grounds, which the 
Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order. Id.; Herrick v. Grindr, 765 Fed. Appx. 586 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 195. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 406 (explaining that Section 
230(c)(2) provides broad protections for good-faith over-screening of content). 
 196. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to . . . material 
that the provide or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable . . . .”). 
 197. Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMEND. INST. [hereinafter Citron, Section 230’s Challenge], 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challenge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
[https://perma.cc/MHN7-JXZJ] (describing history of § 230 and recent developments). See generally 
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 170. For an illuminating explanation of the 
cases that prompted the adoption of Section 230 and its broad interpretation, see generally JEFF 
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). 
 198. The firm in question happens to have been the one that is the subject of the film Wolf of Wall 
Street. See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About to Change, 
NPR MORNING EDITION (Mar. 21, 2018), 
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was to help “clean up” the Internet by making it easier for willing platforms to 
filter out offensive material, removing the risk that doing so would incur civil 
liability by casting them in a publisher’s role.199 
At the time, sponsors Senators James Exon and Slade Gorton sought to 
combat online pornography and make the “Internet” safe for kids.200 
Representatives Cox and Ron Wyden, another sponsor, argued that, if “this 
amazing new thing—the Internet—[was] going to blossom,” companies should 
not be “punished for trying to keep things clean.”201 
This intent is clear in the language of Section 230(c)(2), which expressly 
concerns platforms engaged in “good faith” editorial activity involving the 
blocking and filtering of offensive user-posted content. The speaker and 
publisher liability provision of Section 230, however, lacks this narrowing 
language and has become a foundation for courts to interpret Section 230 
immunity broadly.202 
No doubt, Section 230’s immunity provision has been beneficial for digital 
expression and democratic culture. It has provided breathing room for the 
development of online services and innumerable opportunities for speech and 
discourse.203 Its supporters contend that without immunity, search engines, social 
networks, and microblogging services might not have emerged.204 We agree; the 
fear of publisher liability would likely have inhibited the Internet’s early 
growth.205 
However, an overbroad reading of Section 230 has “given online platforms 
a free pass to ignore illegal activities, to deliberately repost illegal material, and 
to solicit unlawful activities while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified.”206 
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behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm.”207 The results have 
been two-fold. On one hand, the law has created an open environment for hosting 
and distributing user-generated online content. On the other, it has generated an 
environment in which it is exceptionally hard to hold providers accountable, 
even in egregious circumstances involving systematic disinformation and 
falsehoods.208 
Courts have extended the immunity provision to a remarkable array of 
scenarios. They include instances where a provider republished content knowing 
it violated the law;209 solicited illegal content while ensuring that those 
responsible could not be identified;210 altered its user interface to ensure that 
criminals could were not caught;211 and sold dangerous products.212 In this way, 
Section 230 has evolved into a super-immunity that, among other things, 
prevents the best-positioned entities to respond to most harmful content. This 
would have seemed absurd to the CDA’s drafters.213 The law’s overbroad 
interpretation means that platforms have no liability-based reason to take down 
illicit material, and that victims have no legal leverage to insist otherwise.214 
Rebecca Tushnet aptly expressed it a decade ago: Section 230 ensures that 
platforms enjoy “power without responsibility.”215 
Unfortunately, platforms’ power now includes the ability to ignore the 
propagation of damaging deep fakes. To be sure, some platforms do not need 
civil liability exposure to take action against deep-fake generated harms; market 
pressures and morals are enough. In most cases, however, these forces are 
insufficient to spur response. 
Should Section 230 be amended to extend liability to a wider-range of 
circumstances? In 2018, lawmakers modified the statute by enacting the Allow 
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) to address 
websites’ facilitation of sex trafficking.216 FOSTA added a new exception to 
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Section 230 immunity, similar to the provision preserving the ability to sue for 
intellectual property claims. Now, plaintiffs, including state attorneys general, 
acting on behalf of victims, may avoid Section 230 immunity when suing 
platforms for knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating sex trafficking 
offenses. 
FOSTA did not become law without controversy. Some decried the erosion 
of Section 230 over concerns that greater liability exposure for online platforms 
would result in a decrease in outlets, and more self-censorship by those 
remaining.217 Others criticized FOSTA’s language as indeterminate, potentially 
resulting in less filtering rather than more.218 On the other hand, the FOSTA 
debate also raises the question whether Congress instead erred by not going far 
enough in carving out exceptions to Section 230 immunity. 
Section 230 should be amended to allow a limited degree of platform 
liability relating to deep fakes. 219 Building on prior work in which one of us 
(Citron) proposed a similar change in an article co-authored with Benjamin 
Wittes, we propose that Section 230(c)(1) protections to platforms be conditional 
rather than automatic.220 To qualify, an entity must demonstrate that it has taken 
“reasonable steps” to ensure that its platform is not being used for illegal ends. 
Platforms that meet this relatively-undemanding requirement will continue to 
enjoy the protections of Section 230, but others will not and hence may be treated 
as a publisher of user-generated content that they host.221 
To be sure, such an amendment would raise hard questions regarding the 
metes and bounds of reasonableness. The scope of the duty would need to track 
salient differences among online entities. For example, “ISPs and social 
networks with millions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to complaints 
of abuse immediately, let alone within a day or two,”222 yet “they may be able to 
deploy technologies to detect content previously deemed unlawful.”223 
Inevitably, the “duty of care will evolve as technology improves.”224 
This proposed amendment would be useful as a means to incentivize 
platforms to take reasonable steps to minimize the most-serious harms that might 
follow from user-posted or user-distributed deep fakes. If the reasonably 
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available technical and other means for detection and removal of harmful fakes 
are limited, so too will be the obligation on the part of the platform.225 But as 
those means improve, so would the incentive to use them.226 
We recognize that this proposal runs risks, beyond the usual challenges 
associated with common law development of a novel standard of care. For 
example, opening the door to liability may over-deter platforms that are 
uncertain about the standard of care (and fearful of runaway juries imposing 
massive damages). This might drive sites to shutter (or to never emerge), and it 
might cause undue private censorship at the sites that remain. Free expression, 
innovation, and commerce all would suffer, on this view. 
To ameliorate these concerns, this proposal can be cabined along several 
dimensions. First, the amendment to Section 230 could include a sunset 
provision paired with data-gathering requirements that would empower 
Congress to make an informed decision on renewal.227 Data-gathering should 
include the type and frequency of content removed by platforms as well as the 
extent to which platforms use automation to filter or block certain types of 
content. This would permit Congress to assess whether the law was resulting in 
overbroad private censorship, and acting as a Heckler’s veto. Second, the 
amendment could include carefully tailored damages caps. Third, the 
amendment could be paired with a federal anti-SLAAP provision, which would 
deter frivolous lawsuits designed to silence protected speech. Last, the 
amendment could include an exhaustion-of-remedies provision pursuant to 
which plaintiffs, as a precondition to suit, must first provide notice to the 
platform regarding the allegedly improper content. The platform would have a 
specified window of time to examine and respond to the objection. 
In sum, a reasonably calibrated standard of care combined with safeguards 
could reduce opportunities for abuses without interfering unduly with the further 
development of a vibrant Internet. It would also avoid unintentionally turning 
innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for those injured through their sites. 
Approaching the problem with the goal of setting an appropriate standard more 
readily allows differentiation between kinds of online actors, and a separate rule 
for websites designed to facilitate illegality in contrast to large ISPs linking 
millions to the Internet. That said, features used to control the scope of platform 
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liability are only a partial solution to the deep-fakes challenge. Other policy 
responses will be necessary. 
3. Specific Categories of Criminal Liability 
Civil liability is not the only means through which the legal system can 
discourage the creation and distribution of harmful deep fakes. Criminal liability 
is another possibility. Can it close some of the gaps identified above? 
Only to a limited extent. The criminal liability model in theory does have 
the capacity to overcome some of the most significant limits on the civil liability 
model. Being judgment proof might spare someone from fear of civil suit, for 
example, but it is no protection from being sent to prison and bearing the other 
consequences of criminal conviction.228 And whereas the identification and 
service of process on the creator or distributor of a harmful deep fake often will 
be beyond the practical reach of would-be private plaintiffs, law enforcement 
entities have greater investigative capacities (in addition to the ability to seek 
extradition). It is far from clear, though, that these notional advantages can be 
brought to bear effectively in practice. 
To some extent, the capacity of criminal law is a question of setting law 
enforcement priorities and allocating resources accordingly. So far, law 
enforcement’s track record is not promising. Notwithstanding notable 
exceptions, law enforcement, on the whole, has had a lackluster response to 
online abuse. In particular, state and local law enforcement agencies often fail to 
pursue cyberstalking complaints adequately because they lack training in the 
relevant laws and in the investigative techniques necessary to track down online 
abusers (federal prosecutors—including especially DOJ’s Computer Crimes and 
Intellectual Property Section—have a much stronger record, but their capabilities 
do not scale easily).229 Although a wide range of deep fakes might warrant 
criminal charges, only the most extreme cases are likely to attract the attention 
of law enforcement. 
Apart from questions of investigative and prosecutorial will, the prospects 
for criminal liability also depend on the scope of criminal laws themselves. To 
what extent do existing laws actually cover deep fakes, and to what extent might 
new ones do so? 
A number of current criminal statutes—concerning cyber stalking, 
impersonation, and defamation—are potentially relevant. Posting deep fakes in 
connection with the targeting of individuals, for example, might violate the 
federal cyberstalking laws, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, or analogous state statutes. Under 
federal law, it is a felony to use any “interactive computer service or electronic 
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communication service” to “intimidate”230 a person in ways “reasonably 
expected to cause substantial emotional distress . . . .”231 This reflects the fact 
that, even when cyberstalking victims do not fear bodily harm, “their lives are 
totally disrupted . . . in the most insidious and frightening ways.”232 Defendants 
can be punished for up to five years in prison and fined up to $250,000, with 
additional sentencing requirements for repeat offenders and for defendants 
whose offense violates a restraining order.233 Some deep fakes will fit this bill. 
Impersonation crimes may be applicable as well. Several states make it a 
crime, for example, to knowingly and credibly impersonate another person 
online with intent to “harm[], intimidat[e], threaten[], or defraud[]” that 
person.234 And while the “harm, intimidate, threaten” portion of such statutes to 
some extent tracks the cyberstalking statute described above, its extension to 
“fraud” opens the door to a wider, though uncertain, range of potential 
applications. In certain jurisdictions, creators of deep fakes could also face 
charges for criminal defamation if they posted videos knowing that they were 
fake or if they were reckless as to their truth or falsity.235 Similarly, using 
someone’s face in a violent deep-fake sex video might support charges for both 
impersonation and defamation if the defendant intended to terrorize or harm the 
person and knew the video was fake. 
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The foregoing examples concern harm to specific individuals, but some 
harms flowing from deep fakes will be distributed broadly across society. A 
pernicious example of the latter is a deep fake calculated to spur an audience to 
violence. Some platforms ban content calling for violence, but not all do.236 
Could the creator of such a deep fake be prosecuted under a statute like 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2101, which criminalizes the use of facilities of interstate commerce, such as 
the Internet, with intent to incite a riot? Incitement charges must comport with 
the First Amendment constraints identified in Brandenburg, including that the 
speech in question be likely to produce imminent lawless action.237 This leaves 
many deep fakes beyond the law’s reach even though they may have played a 
role in violence. 
Can criminal law be helpful in limiting harms from deep fakes in the 
particularly sensitive context of elections? Although lies have long plagued the 
democratic process, deep fakes present a troubling development. Some states 
have criminalized the intentional use of lies to impact elections.238 These 
experiments have run into constitutional hurdles, however. 
Free speech scholar Helen Norton explains that while political candidates’ 
lies “pose . . . harms to their listeners . . . and may also . . . undermine public 
confidence in the integrity of the political process,” laws forbidding such lies 
“threaten significant First Amendment harms because they regulate expression 
in a context in which we especially fear government overreaching and partisan 
abuse.”239 As the Court underscored in Brown v. Hartlage,240 the “State’s fear 
that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a 
compelling justification for limiting speech.”241 Not surprisingly, courts 
therefore have struck down periodic attempts to ban election-related lies.242 The 
entry of deep fakes into the mix may not change that result. As explored above, 
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however, criminal laws banning the impersonation of government officials or 
candidates for office may overcome constitutional challenge.243 
Ultimately, criminal liability is not likely to be a particularly effective tool 
against deep fakes that pertain to elections. The most capable actors with motive 
and means to deploy deep fakes in a high-impact manner in an election setting 
will include the intelligence services of foreign governments engaging in such 
activity as a form of covert action, as we saw with Russia in relation to the 
American election of 2016. The prospect of a criminal prosecution in the United 
States will mean little to foreign government agents involved in such activity so 
long as they are not likely to end up in US custody (though it might mean 
something more to private actors through whom those agencies sometimes 
choose to act, at least if they intend to travel abroad).244 
C. Administrative Agency Solutions 
The foregoing analysis suggests that prosecutors and private plaintiffs can 
and likely will play an important role in curbing harms from deep fakes, but also 
that this role has significant limitations. We therefore turn to consider the 
potential contributions of other actors, starting with administrative agencies. 
Generally speaking, agencies can advance public policy goals through 
rulemaking, adjudication, or both.245 Agencies do not enjoy plenary jurisdiction 
to use these tools in relation to any subject they wish. Typically, their field of 
operation is defined—with varying degrees of specificity—by statute. And thus 
we might begin by asking which agencies have the most plausible grounds for 
addressing deep fakes. 
At the federal level, three candidates stand out: the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and 
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). On close inspection, however, their 
potential roles appear quite limited. 
1. The FTC 
Consider the Federal Trade Commission and its charge to regulate and 
litigate in an effort to minimize deceptive or unfair commercial acts and 
practices.246 For that matter, consider the full range of state actors (often a state’s 
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Attorney General’s Office) that play a similar role. Bearing that charge in mind, 
can these entities intervene in the deep fake context? 
A review of current areas of FTC activity suggests limited possibilities. 
Most deep fakes will not take the form of advertising, but some will. That subset 
will implicate the FTC’s role in protecting consumers from fraudulent 
advertising relating to “food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics.”247 Some 
deep fakes will be in the nature of satire or parody, without intent or even effect 
of misleading consumers into believing a particular person (a celebrity or some 
other public figure) is endorsing the product or service in question. That line will 
be crossed in some instances, however. If such a case involves a public figure 
who is aware of the fraud and both inclined to and capable of suing on their own 
behalf for misappropriation of likeness, there is no need for the FTC or a state 
agency to become involved. Those conditions will not always be met, though, 
especially when the deep-fake element involves a fraudulent depiction of 
something other than a specific person’s words or deeds; there would be no 
obvious private plaintiff. The FTC and state attorneys general (state AGs) can 
play an important role in that setting. 
Beyond deceptive advertising, the FTC has authority to investigate unfair 
and deceptive commercial acts and practices under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.248 Much like Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, state UDAP laws (enforced by state AGs) prohibit deceptive commercial 
acts and practices and unfair trade acts and practices whose costs exceed their 
benefits.249 UDAP laws empower attorneys general to seek civil penalties, 
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.250 
Acting in that capacity, for example, the FTC previously investigated and 
reached a settlement with Facebook regarding its treatment of user data—and is 
now doing so again in the aftermath of public furor over the Cambridge 
Analytica debacle.251 In response to the problem of fake news in general and 
deep-fake news in particular, the FTC might contemplate asserting a role under 
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the rubric of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”252 
Any such efforts would face several obstacles, however. First, Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act as currently written would shield platforms at 
least to some extent from liability for publishing users’ deep fakes. Second, it is 
not clear this would be a proper interpretation of the FTC’s jurisdiction. 
Professor David Vladeck, formerly head of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, has expressed doubt about the FTC’s jurisdiction to regulate sites 
purveying fake news.253 Vladeck argues, “[f]ake news stories that get circulated 
or planted or tweeted around are not trying to induce someone to purchase a 
product; they’re trying to induce someone to believe an idea.”254 Finally, the 
prospect of a government entity attempting to distinguish real news from fake 
news—and suppressing the latter—raises the First Amendment concerns 
described above in relation to election-lies laws. 
Might a different agency at least have a stronger jurisdictional claim to 
become involved in some settings? This brings us to the Federal 
Communications Commission. 
2. The FCC 
If any regulatory agency is to play a role policing against harms from deep 
fakes circulating online, the FCC at first blush might seem a natural fit. It has a 
long tradition of regulating the communications of broadcasters, and many have 
observed that the major social media platforms of the twenty-first century occupy 
a place in our information ecosystem similar to the central role that radio and 
television broadcasters enjoyed in the twentieth century.255 Similar thinking led 
the FCC in 2015 to break new ground by reclassifying Internet service providers 
as a “telecommunications service” rather than an “information service,” thus 
opening the door to more extensive regulation.256 Amidst intense controversy, 
however, the FCC in late 2017 reversed course on this position on ISPs,257 and 
in any event never asserted that so-called “edge providers” like Facebook also 
should be brought under the “telecommunications service” umbrella.258 
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As things stand, the FCC appears to lack jurisdiction (not to mention 
interest) over content circulated via social media. However, concern over fake 
news, incitement, radicalization, or any number of other hot-button issues might 
at some point tip the scales either for the FCC to reinterpret its own authority or 
for Congress to intervene. For the moment, however, this pathway appears 
closed, leaving the FCC’s role in relation to deep fakes limited to potential efforts 
to deter their appearance on radio or television. 
3. The FEC 
A third federal agency with a plausible stake in the topic of deep fakes is 
the Federal Election Commission. Plainly, its jurisdiction would touch upon deep 
fakes only as they relate to elections—a narrow, but important, subfield. Whether 
and how the FEC might act in relation to deep fakes even in that setting, however, 
is unclear. 
The FEC regulates campaign speech, but not in ways that would speak 
directly to the deep-fake scenario. In particular, the FEC does not purport to 
regulate the truth of campaign-related statements, nor is it likely to assert or 
receive such jurisdiction anytime soon for all the reasons discussed above in 
relation to the First Amendment obstacles, practical difficulty, and political 
sensitivity of such an enterprise. Instead, its central focus is financing, and the 
main thrust of its regulatory efforts relating to speech is to increase transparency 
regarding sponsorship and funding for political advertising.259 
There might be room for a regulatory approach that requires deep fake 
creators to disclose the fact that the video or audio is a fake.260 The Court has 
upheld campaign speech regulations requiring truthful disclosure of the source 
of the communication.261 And for good reason—listeners depend upon the source 
of speech to make decisions at the ballot box.262 
Such an approach could have at least some positive impact on deep fakes 
in the electoral setting. For outlets within the FEC’s jurisdiction, transparency 
obligations create elements of attribution and accountability for content creators 
that might, to some extent, deter resort to deep fakes in advertising. But note that 
major online social media platforms are not, currently, subject to FEC 
jurisdiction in this context: Facebook, Google, and other online advertising 
platforms have long-resisted imposition of the FEC’s disclosure rules, often 
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citing the practical difficulties that would follow for small screens displaying 
even smaller ads. 
In the wake of the 2016 election, the FEC faces pressure to extend its reach 
to these platforms nonetheless, so that caveat might drop out at some point.263 
Even so, this certainly would not resolve the threat to elections posed by deep 
fakes. 
FEC regulation surely would not eliminate deep fakes’ threat to elections. 
Some amount of fraudulent posting no doubt would continue simply because 
enforcement systems will not be perfect, and also because not all content about 
someone who is a candidate will be framed in ways that would appear to count 
as advertising. Deep fakes in particular are likely to take the form of just raw 
video or audio of some event that occurred, by no means necessarily embedded 
within any larger narrative or framing content. The FEC’s disclosure rules in any 
event are candidate specific, and do not encompass generalized “issue ads” that 
express views on a topic but do not single out particular candidates. 
D. Coercive Responses 
The utility of civil suits, criminal prosecution, and regulatory actions will 
be limited when the source of the fake is a foreign entity that may lie beyond the 
reach of American judicial process (though it is not non-existent, as we have seen 
from time to time in the context of cybersecurity).264 Nevertheless, it is important 
to recall that the Government possesses other instruments that it can bring to bear 
in such contexts in order to impose significant costs on the perpetrators. We 
provide a brief discussion of three such scenarios here. 
1. Military Responses 
There is no doubt that deep fakes will play a role in future armed conflicts. 
Information operations of various kinds have long been an important aspect of 
warfare, as the contending parties attempt to influence the beliefs, will, and 
passions of a wide range of audiences (opposing forces and their commanders, 
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opposing politicians and electorates, local populations, allies, and so forth).265 
Such effects are sought at every level from the tactical to the strategic, and with 
an eye towards effects ranging from the immediate to the long-term. 
Deep-fake capacity will be useful in all such settings. Insurgents, for 
example, might inflame local opinion against US or allied forces by depicting 
those forces burning a Quran or killing a civilian. If deployed deftly enough, 
such fraud might also be used to advance a “lawfare” strategy, leveraging the 
good intentions of journalists and NGOs to generate distracting or even 
debilitating legal, political, and diplomatic friction. Insurgents also might deploy 
the technology to make their own leaders or personnel appear more admirable or 
brave than otherwise might be possible, to create the false impression that they 
were in a particular location at a particular time, or even to make it seem that a 
particular leader is still alive and free rather than dead or captured. The US 
military, for its part, might use deep fakes to undermine the credibility of an 
insurgent leader by making it appear that the person is secretly cooperating with 
the United States or engaging in immoral or otherwise hypocritical behavior. If 
the technology is robust enough, and deployed deftly enough, the opportunities 
for mischief—deadly mischief, in some cases—will be plentiful on both sides. 
If and when adversaries of the United States do use deep fakes in 
connection with an armed conflict, the options for a military response would be 
no different than would be the case for any form of enemy information operation. 
This might entail penetration of the adversary’s computer networks, for purposes 
of both intelligence gathering, making it easier to prepare for or respond to a 
deep fake, and disruption operations, degrading or destroying the adversary’s 
capacity to produce them in the first place. It might entail a kinetic strike on 
facilities or individuals involved in the deep fake production process, subject of 
course to the law of armed conflict rules governing distinction, proportionality, 
and so forth.266 And it might entail the capture and detention of enemy personnel 
or supporters involved in such work. 
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The situation becomes more complicated insofar as the individuals or 
servers involved in creating deep fakes relating to an armed conflict are not 
actually located in theater. If either reside in third countries, the freedom of 
action for a military response of any kind may be sharply circumscribed both by 
policy and by legal considerations. This is a familiar challenge for the military 
in relation to non-deep-fake online propaganda activity conducted by and for the 
Islamic State using servers outside the Syria/Iraq theater, and the manner in 
which it would play out would be no different (for better or worse) if one 
introduces deep-fake technology to the mix. 
2. Covert Action 
Covert action might be used as a response to a foreign government’s use of 
deep fakes. “Covert action” refers to government-sponsored activity that is 
meant to impact events overseas without the US government’s role being 
apparent or acknowledged.267 That is a capacious definition, encompassing a 
wide-range of potential activities. Propaganda and other information operations, 
for example, can be and frequently are conducted as covert actions. And certainly 
we can expect to see the intelligence services of many countries making use of 
deep-fake technologies in that context in the future (the Russian covert action 
campaign that targeted the American election in 2016 was significant even 
without the aid of deep fakes, but one can certainly expect to see deep fakes used 
in such settings in the future). The point of mentioning covert action here is not 
to repeat the claim that states will use deep fakes on an unacknowledged basis in 
the future. Instead, the point is to underscore that the US government has the 
option of turning to covert action in response to a foreign government’s use of 
deep fakes. 
What, in particular, might this entail? First, it could be the basis for 
degrading or destroying the technical capacity of a foreign actor to produce deep 
fakes (for example, through a computer network operation designed to make 
subtle changes to a GAN). The military options described above also included 
such technical means, but covert action offers advantages over the military 
alternative. Most notably, covert action does not require any predicate 
circumstance of armed conflict; presidents may resort to it when they wish. 
Moreover, because covert action is not publicly acknowledged, the diplomatic 
and political friction that might otherwise make a particular action unattractive 
is reduced in comparison to overt alternatives (although not necessarily 
eliminated, for the activity may later become public). Further, covert action may 
be a particularly attractive option where the activity in question might violate 
international law. The statutory framework governing covert action requires 
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compliance with the Constitution and statutes of the United States, but it is 
conspicuously silent about compliance with international law. Many have 
speculated that this is construed within the government as domestic-law 
justification for activities that violate international law.268 
Covert action can take any number of other forms. Rather than directly 
disrupting a foreign target’s capacity to produce deep fakes, for example, covert 
means might be used in a wide variety of ways to impose costs on the person, 
organization, or government at issue. Covert action, in other words, can be used 
to deter or punish foreign actors that employ deep fakes in ways harmful to the 
United States.269 
Covert-action tools are not the only options the US government has with 
respect to imposing costs on foreign individuals or entities who may make 
harmful use of deep fakes. We turn now to a brief discussion of a leading 
example of an overt tool that can serve this same purpose quite effectively. 
3. Sanctions 
The economic might the United States developed over the past half-century 
has given the US Government considerable leverage over foreign governments, 
entities, and individuals. Congress, in turn, has empowered the executive branch 
to move quickly and largely at the president’s discretion when it wishes to exploit 
that leverage to advance certain interests. Most notably for present purposes, the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) establishes a 
framework for the executive branch to issue economic sanctions backed by 
criminal penalties.270 
In order to bring this power to bear, IEEPA requires that the president first 
issue a public proclamation of a “national emergency” relating to an “unusual 
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside 
the United States.”271 In order to deploy IEEPA sanctions as an overt response 
to foreign use of deep fakes, therefore, there needs to be either a relevant existing 
national-emergency proclamation or else plausible grounds for issuing a new one 
towards that end. 
There is no current national-emergency proclamation that would apply 
generally to the problem of deep fakes. There are more than two-dozen currently 
active states of national emergency, as of the summer of 2018.272 Most have little 
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possible relevance, but some relate broadly to particular threat actors or regions, 
and a deep-fake scenario conceivably might arise in ways that both implicate 
those actors or regions and involve actors not already subject to sanctions. 
A particularly important question under this heading is whether any of these 
existing authorities would apply to a foreign entity employing deep fakes to 
impact American elections. The answer appears to be yes, though the matter is 
complicated. 
In April 2015, President Obama’s Executive Order 13964 proclaimed a 
national emergency with respect to “malicious cyber-enabled activities 
originating from, or directed by persons located . . . outside the United States.”273 
Then, in the aftermath of the 2016 election, Obama amended the order, 
expanding the prohibition to forbid foreign entities from using cyber-enabled 
means to “tamper[] with, alter[], or caus[e] a misappropriation of information 
with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes 
or institutions . . . .”274 This was designed to allow for IEEPA sanctions against 
Russian entities that interfered in the 2016 election through means that included 
the DNC hack. 
President Obama immediately used the authority to sanction Russia’s FSB, 
GRU, and various other individuals and entities.275 But could the same be done 
to a foreign entity that had not engaged in hacking, and instead focused entirely 
on using social media platforms to propagate false information in ways meant to 
impact American politics?276 
To the surprise of some observers, the Trump administration provided at 
least a degree of support for the broader interpretation in March 2018 when it 
issued sanctions against Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) under color 
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of this framework.277 The IRA, infamously, had engaged in extensive efforts to 
propagate false information into the American political debate. When the Trump 
administration sanctioned it under color of the cyber executive order, this seemed 
to endorse the proposition that politically targeted information operations carried 
out online were enough, even without hacking, to trigger the IEEPA framework. 
A close read of the Treasury Department’s explanation of IRA’s inclusion, 
however, includes just enough reference to “misappropriation of information” 
and to illegal use of stolen personally identifiable information so as to muddy the 
precedent.278 
Bearing this lingering uncertainty in mind, we recommend promulgation of 
a new national emergency specifically tailored to attempts by foreign entities to 
inject false information into America’s political dialogue, without any need to 
show that such efforts at some point happened to involve hacking or any other 
“cyber-enabled” means. This would eliminate any doubt about the immediate 
availability of IEEPA-based sanctions. Attempts to employ deep fakes in aid of 
such efforts would, of course, be encompassed in such a regime. 
E. Market Solutions 
We anticipate two types of market-based reactions to the deep-fake threat. 
First, we expect the private sector to develop and sell services intended to protect 
customers from at least some forms of deep fake-based harms. Such innovations 
might build on the array of services that have emerged in recent years in response 
to customer anxieties about identity theft and the like. Second, we expect at least 
some social media companies to take steps on their own initiative to police 
against deep-fake harms on their platforms. They will do this not just because 
they perceive market advantage in doing so, of course, but also for reasons 
including policy preferences and, perhaps, concern over what legislative 
interventions, including amendments to Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, might occur down the road if they take no action. Both prospects 
offer benefits, but there are both limits and risks as well. 
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1. Immutable Life Logs as an Alibi Service 
Consider a worst-case scenario: a world in which it is cheap and easy to 
portray people as having done or said things they did not say or do, with 
inadequate technology to quickly and reliably expose fakes and inadequate law 
or policy tools to deter and punish them. In that environment, a person who 
cannot credibly demonstrate their real location, words, and deeds at a given 
moment will be at greater risk than those who can. Credible alibis will become 
increasingly valuable as a result; demand for new ways to secure them—for 
services that ensure that one can disprove a harmful fake—will grow, spurring 
innovation as companies see a revenue opportunity. 
We predict the development of a profitable new service: immutable life 
logs or authentication trails that make it possible for a victim of a deep fake to 
produce a certified alibi credibly proving that he or she did not do or say the 
thing depicted.279 
From a technical perspective, such services will be made possible by 
advances in a variety of technologies including wearable tech; encryption; 
remote sensing; data compression, transmission, and storage; and blockchain-
based record-keeping. That last element will be particularly important, for a 
vendor hoping to provide such services could not succeed without earning a 
strong reputation for the immutability and comprehensiveness of its data; 
otherwise, the service would not have the desired effect when called upon in the 
face of an otherwise-devastating deep fake. 
Providing access to a credible digital alibi would not be enough, however. 
The vendor also would need to be able to provide quick and effective 
dissemination of it; the victim alone often will be in a poor position to 
accomplish that, for the reasons discussed above in Part I. But it is possible that 
one or a few providers of an immutable life log service can accomplish this to 
no small degree. The key would be partnerships with a wide array of social media 
platforms, with arrangements made for those companies to rapidly and reliably 
coordinate with the provider when a complaint arises regarding possible deep-
fake content on their site. 
Obviously, not everyone would want such a service even if it could work 
reasonably effectively as a deep-fake defense mechanism. But some individuals 
(politicians, celebrities, and others whose fortunes depend to an unusual degree 
on fragile reputations) will have sufficient fear of suffering irreparable harm 
from deep fakes that they may be willing to agree to—and pay for—a service 
that comprehensively tracks and preserves their movements, surrounding visual 
circumstances, and perhaps in-person and electronic communications; although 
providers may be reluctant to include audio-recording capacity because some 
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states criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless all 
parties to a communication consent to the interception.280 
Of course, a subset of such a service—location verification—is available 
already, thanks to the ubiquity of phones with location tracking features as well 
as cell-site location records. But it is one thing to have theoretical access to a 
business record proving that a device (though not necessarily the person 
associated with it) was in some general location. It would be quite another to 
have ready and reliable access to proof—perhaps backed by video—that the 
person was in a very precise location and acting and speaking in particular ways. 
And if the provider of such a service manages to partner with major platforms in 
a way that facilitates not just reliable but rapid and efficient verification services, 
this could be a sizable advantage. 
Even so, it may be that few individuals will want to surrender privacy in 
this way. We think it likely, though, that more than a few organizations will 
consider requiring use of tracking services by at least some employees at least 
some of the time. The protective rationale for the service will be a considerable 
incentive for the organization, but note that this interest might dovetail robustly 
with distinct managerial interests in deterring or catching employee misfeasance 
and malfeasance. This is much like the earlier wave of innovation that led to 
installation of dashboard cameras in police cars and the current wave involving 
the proliferation of body cameras on the officers themselves. 
We urge caution in encouraging the emergence of such services. Whatever 
the benefits, the social cost (should such services emerge and prove popular) 
would be profound. 
Proliferation of comprehensive life logging would have tremendous 
spillover impacts on privacy in general. Indeed, it risks what has been called the 
“unraveling of privacy”281—the outright functional collapse of privacy via social 
consent despite legal protections intended to preserve it. Scott Peppet has warned 
that, as more people relinquish their privacy voluntarily, the remainder 
increasingly risks being subject to the inference that they have something to 
hide.282 This dynamic might eventually overcome the reluctance of some 
holdouts. Worse, the holdouts in any event will lose much of their lingering 
privacy, as they find themselves increasingly surrounded by people engaged in 
life-logging. 
Note the position of power in which this places the suppliers of these 
services. The scale and nature of the data they would host would be 
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extraordinary, both as to individual clients and more broadly across segments of 
society or even society as a whole. A given company might commit not to exploit 
that data for commercial or research purposes, hoping instead to draw revenue 
solely from customer subscriptions. But the temptation to engage in predictive 
marketing, or to sell access to the various slices of the data, would be 
considerable. The company would possess a database of human behavior of 
unprecedented depth and breadth, after all, or what Paul Ohm has called a 
“database of ruin.”283 The Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandal might pale in 
comparison to the possibilities unleashed by such a database. 
The existence of such a database would also raise privacy issues vis-à-vis 
government investigators. Certainly law enforcement entities would wish to 
access this rich trove of information in many cases.284 Whether they could do so 
without a warrant, however, is unclear at the current time. The Supreme Court’s 
2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States unsettled the so-called “third-party 
doctrine” (i.e., the rule that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant 
for government access to records held by a third party).285 While Carpenter 
disclaimed any intent to abandon the third-party doctrine with respect to 
“conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,”286 
the opinion suggests that a warrant likely would be required in the case of a 
police search of a database of the kind created by comprehensive life logging. 
Indeed, a life-logging database would enable precisely the sort of pervasive 
surveillance of someone’s life that triggered the warrant for access to cell-site 
location data.287 Congress or state legislatures might directly impose such a 
requirement by statute. But at any rate, the important point is that—once the right 
legal process is used—the government’s capacity to know all about a suspect 
would be unrivaled as a historical matter (especially as combined with other 
existing aggregations of data). 
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Despite helping to identify those guilty of crime and avoid mistaken 
prosecution of the innocent, this would produce unprecedented opportunities for 
government authorities to stumble across—and then pursue—other misdeeds, 
and not only those of the original suspect. Society may not be prepared to accept 
what might then be a sharp increase in the degree of detection and enforcement 
that would follow. Moreover, the situation also would expose investigators to a 
considerable amount of information that might not be inculpatory as such, but 
that might, nonetheless, provide important leverage over the suspect or others. 
Again, the resulting enhancement of prosecutorial capacity will be welcome in 
some quarters, but may cause an erosion of commitment to privacy and other 
values. At the very least, this would deserve careful consideration by 
policymakers and lawmakers. 
Ultimately, a world with widespread life logging of this kind might yield 
more good than harm, particularly if paired with legislation guarding access to, 
use of, and security accorded such comprehensive databases. But it might not. 
For now, our aim is no more and no less than to identify the possibility that the 
rise of deep fakes will in turn give birth to such a service, and to flag the 
implications this will have for privacy. Enterprising businesses may seek to meet 
the pressing demand to counter deep fakes in this way, but it does not follow that 
society should welcome—or wholly accept—that development. Careful 
reflection is essential now, before either deep fakes or responsive services get 
too far ahead of us. 
2. Speech Policies of Platforms 
Our last set of observations concern what may prove to be the most salient 
response mechanism of them all: the content screening-and-removal policies of 
the platforms themselves, as expressed and established via their terms-of-service 
(TOS) agreements. 
TOS agreements are the single most important documents governing digital 
speech in today’s world, in contrast to prior ages where the First Amendment 
provided the road map for speech that was permissible in public discourse.288 
Today’s most important speech fora, for better or worse, are online platforms, 
not public fora like public parks or streets. TOS agreements of private companies 
determine if speech on the major platforms is visible, prominent, or viewed, or 
if instead it is hidden, muted, or never available at all.289 TOS agreements thus 
will be primary battlegrounds in the fight to minimize the harms that deep fakes 
may cause. The First Amendment has little to say about the choices that private 
companies make about what speech can and cannot appear on their services. 
Some TOS agreements already ban certain categories of content. For 
instance, Twitter has long banned impersonation, without regard to the 
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technology involved in making the impersonation persuasive.290 And Google’s 
policy against non-consensual pornography now clearly applies to deep fakes of 
that kind. These are salutary developments, and other platforms can and should 
follow their lead even as all the platforms explore the question of what other 
variants of deep fakes likewise should be the subject of TOS prohibition. 
As the platforms explore this question, though, they should explicitly 
commit themselves to what one of us (Citron) has called “technological due 
process.”291 Technological due process requires companies be transparent—not 
just notionally but in real practical terms—about their speech policies. Platforms 
should be clear, for example, about what precisely they mean when they ban 
impersonation generally and deep fakes specifically. In our view, platforms 
should recognize that some deep fakes are not on balance problematic and should 
remain online. Thus, TOS should specify that deep-fake ban would not cover 
satire, parody, art, or education, as explored above. In our view, such deep fakes 
should not normally be filtered, blocked, muted, or relegated to obscurity. 
Platforms should provide accountability for their speech-suppression 
decisions, moreover. Users should be notified that their (alleged) deep-fake posts 
have been blocked, removed, or muted and given a meaningful chance to 
challenge the decision.292 After all, as we noted above there is a significant risk 
that growing awareness of the deep fake threat will carry with it bad faith 
exploitation of that awareness on the part of those who seek to avoid 
accountability for their real words and actions via a well-timed allegation of 
fakery. 
The subject of technological due process also draws attention to the 
challenge of just how platforms can and should identify and respond to content 
that may be fake. For now, platforms must rely on users and in-house content 
moderators to identify deep fakes. The choice between human decision-making 
and automation is crucial to technological due process.293 Exclusive reliance on 
automated filtering is not the answer, at least for now, because it is too likely to 
be plagued both by false positives and false negatives.294 It may have a useful 
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role to play in flagging specific content for further review by actual analysts, but 
normally should not serve as the last word or the basis for automatic speech-
suppressive action (though an exception would be proper for situations in which 
content previously has been determined, with due care, to be fraudulent, and 
software detects that someone is attempting to post that identical content). 
The good news—and we would like to end on such a note—is that some of 
the largest platforms do recognize the problem deep fakes present, and are 
beginning to take steps to respond. Facebook, for example, plans to emphasize 
video content to a growing degree and has stated that it will begin tracking fake 
videos.295 Also underway are efforts to emphasize videos from verified sources 
while also affirmatively deemphasizing ones that are not; this will not correspond 
perfectly with legitimate versus fake videos of course, but it might help to some 
degree, although at some cost to the ability of anonymous speakers to be heard 
via that platform.296 Much more will be needed, but the start is welcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the adage about sticks-and-stones, words in the form of 
lies have always had the ability cause significant harm to individuals, 
organizations, and society at large. From that perspective, the rise of deep fakes 
might seem merely a technological twist to a long-standing social ill. 
But another adage—that a picture is worth a thousand words—draws 
attention to what makes the deep-fake phenomenon more significant than that. 
Credible yet fraudulent audio and video will have a much-magnified impact, and 
today’s social media-oriented information environment interacts with our 
cognitive biases in ways that exacerbate the effect still further. A host of costs 
and dangers will follow, and our legal and policy architectures are not optimally 
designed to respond. Our recommendations would help with that to some degree, 
but the problem to a considerable degree would still remain. A great deal of 
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